870

The Church, the Pope.  Unity, plurality.—­Considering the Church as a unity, the Pope, who is its head, is as the whole.  Considering it as a plurality, the Pope is only a part of it.  The Fathers have considered the Church now in the one way, now in the other.  And thus they have spoken differently of the Pope. (Saint Cyprian:  Sacerdos Dei.) But in establishing one of these truths, they have not excluded the other.  Plurality which is not reduced to unity is confusion; unity which does not depend on plurality is tyranny.  There is scarcely any other country than France in which it is permissible to say that the Council is above the Pope.

871

The Pope is head.  Who else is known of all?  Who else is recognised by all, having power to insinuate himself into all the body, because he holds the principal shoot, which insinuates itself everywhere?  How easy it was to make this degenerate into tyranny!  That is why Christ has laid down for them this precept:  Vos autem non sic.[363]

872

The Pope hates and fears the learned, who do not submit to him at will.

873

We must not judge of what the Pope is by some words of the Fathers—­as the Greeks said in a council, important rules—­but by the acts of the Church and the Fathers, and by the canons.

Duo aut tres in unum.[364] Unity and plurality.  It is an error to exclude one of the two, as the papists do who exclude plurality, or the Huguenots who exclude unity.

874

Would the Pope be dishonoured by having his knowledge from God and tradition; and is it not dishonouring him to separate him from this holy union?

875

God does not perform miracles in the ordinary conduct of His Church.  It would be a strange miracle if infallibility existed in one man.  But it appears so natural for it to reside in a multitude, since the conduct of God is hidden under nature, as in all His other works.

876

Kings dispose of their own power; but the Popes cannot dispose of theirs.

877

Summum jus, summa injuria.

The majority is the best way, because it is visible, and has strength to make itself obeyed.  Yet it is the opinion of the least able.

If men could have done it, they would have placed might in the hands of justice.  But as might does not allow itself to be managed as men want, because it is a palpable quality, whereas justice is a spiritual quality of which men dispose as they please, they have placed justice in the hands of might.  And thus that is called just which men are forced to obey.

Hence comes the right of the sword, for the sword gives a true right.  Otherwise we should see violence on one side and justice on the other (end of the twelfth Provincial).  Hence comes the injustice of the Fronde,[365] which raises its alleged justice against power.  It is not the same in the Church, for there is a true justice and no violence.