78

Descartes useless and uncertain.

79

[Descartes.—­We must say summarily:  “This is made by figure and motion,” for it is true.  But to say what these are, and to compose the machine, is ridiculous.  For it is useless, uncertain, and painful.  And were it true, we do not think all philosophy is worth one hour of pain.]

80

How comes it that a cripple does not offend us, but that a fool does?[45] Because a cripple recognises that we walk straight, whereas a fool declares that it is we who are silly; if it were not so, we should feel pity and not anger.

Epictetus[46] asks still more strongly:  “Why are we not angry if we are told that we have a headache, and why are we angry if we are told that we reason badly, or choose wrongly?” The reason is that we are quite certain that we have not a headache, or are not lame, but we are not so sure that we make a true choice.  So having assurance only because we see with our whole sight, it puts us into suspense and surprise when another with his whole sight sees the opposite, and still more so when a thousand others deride our choice.  For we must prefer our own lights to those of so many others, and that is bold and difficult.  There is never this contradiction in the feelings towards a cripple.

81

It is natural for the mind to believe, and for the will to love;[47] so that, for want of true objects, they must attach themselves to false.

82

Imagination.[48]—­It is that deceitful part in man, that mistress of error and falsity, the more deceptive that she is not always so; for she would be an infallible rule of truth, if she were an infallible rule of falsehood.  But being most generally false, she gives no sign of her nature, impressing the same character on the true and the false.

I do not speak of fools, I speak of the wisest men; and it is among them that the imagination has the great gift of persuasion.  Reason protests in vain; it cannot set a true value on things.

This arrogant power, the enemy of reason, who likes to rule and dominate it, has established in man a second nature to show how all-powerful she is.  She makes men happy and sad, healthy and sick, rich and poor; she compels reason to believe, doubt, and deny; she blunts the senses, or quickens them; she has her fools and sages; and nothing vexes us more than to see that she fills her devotees with a satisfaction far more full and entire than does reason.  Those who have a lively imagination are a great deal more pleased with themselves than the wise can reasonably be.  They look down upon men with haughtiness; they argue with boldness and confidence, others with fear and diffidence; and this gaiety of countenance often gives them the advantage in the opinion of the hearers, such favour have the imaginary wise in the eyes of judges of like nature.  Imagination cannot make fools wise; but she can make them happy, to the envy of reason which can only make its friends miserable; the one covers them with glory, the other with shame.