One says that the sovereign good consists in virtue, another in pleasure, another in the knowledge of nature, another in truth, Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas,[36] another in total ignorance, another in indolence, others in disregarding appearances, another in wondering at nothing, nihil admirari prope res una quae possit facere et servare beatum,[37] and the true sceptics in their indifference, doubt, and perpetual suspense, and others, wiser, think to find a better definition.  We are well satisfied.

To transpose after the laws to the following title.

We must see if this fine philosophy have gained nothing certain from so long and so intent study; perhaps at least the soul will know itself.  Let us hear the rulers of the world on this subject.  What have they thought of her substance? 394.[38] Have they been more fortunate in locating her? 395.[39] What have they found out about her origin, duration, and departure? 399.[40]

Is then the soul too noble a subject for their feeble lights?  Let us then abase her to matter and see if she knows whereof is made the very body which she animates, and those others which she contemplates and moves at her will.  What have those great dogmatists, who are ignorant of nothing, known of this matter? Harum sententiarum,[41] 393.

This would doubtless suffice, if reason were reasonable.  She is reasonable enough to admit that she has been unable to find anything durable, but she does not yet despair of reaching it; she is as ardent as ever in this search, and is confident she has within her the necessary powers for this conquest.  We must therefore conclude, and, after having examined her powers in their effects, observe them in themselves, and see if she has a nature and a grasp capable of laying hold of the truth.]

74

A letter On the Foolishness of Human Knowledge and Philosophy.

This letter before Diversion.

Felix qui potuit ...  Nihil admirari.[42]

280 kinds of sovereign good in Montaigne.[43]

75

Part I, 1, 2, c. 1, section 4.[44]

[Probability.—­It will not be difficult to put the case a stage lower, and make it appear ridiculous.  To begin at the very beginning.] What is more absurd than to say that lifeless bodies have passions, fears, hatreds—­that insensible bodies, lifeless and incapable of life, have passions which presuppose at least a sensitive soul to feel them, nay more, that the object of their dread is the void?  What is there in the void that could make them afraid?  Nothing is more shallow and ridiculous.  This is not all; it is said that they have in themselves a source of movement to shun the void.  Have they arms, legs, muscles, nerves?

76

To write against those who made too profound a study of science: 
Descartes.

77

I cannot forgive Descartes.  In all his philosophy he would have been quite willing to dispense with God.  But he had to make Him give a fillip to set the world in motion; beyond this, he has no further need of God.