[Footnote 29:  Journal of Colonel Williams.]

The day after the arrival of Gates at Clermont, he was joined by seven hundred militia from Virginia, commanded by Brigadier General Stevens, an officer of considerable merit, who, during the campaigns of 1777 and 1778, had commanded a continental regiment.  On the same day, an express arrived from Colonel Sumpter, with information that an escort of clothing, ammunition, and other stores for the garrison at Camden, was on the way from Ninety-Six, and must pass the Wateree at a ferry about a mile from Camden, which was covered by a small redoubt on the opposite side of the river.  One hundred regular infantry with two brass field-pieces, were immediately detached to join Colonel Sumpter, who was ordered to reduce the redoubt, and to intercept the convoy.[30]

[Footnote 30:  Journal of Colonel Williams.]

To attract the attention of the garrison in Camden, and thus co-operate with the expedition under Sumpter, it was determined in a council of general officers to put the army in motion that evening, and to take a post about seven miles from Camden with a deep creek in front.

The sick, the heavy baggage, and the military stores were ordered under a guard to Waxhaws,[31] and the army was directed to be in readiness to march precisely at ten in the evening in the following order.

[Footnote 31:  Colonel Williams says these orders were not executed.]

Colonel Armand’s legion composed the van.  Porterfield’s light infantry, reinforced by a company of picked men from Stevens’s brigade, covered the right flank of the legion; while Major Armstrong’s light infantry of North Carolina militia, reinforced in like manner from Caswell’s division, covered the left.  The Maryland division, followed by the North Carolina and Virginia militia, with the artillery, composed the main body and rear guard; and the volunteer cavalry were equally distributed on the flanks of the baggage.

In the event of an attack in front by the British cavalry, the infantry on the flanks were directed to march up, and to continue their fire on the assailants.  It was supposed they would enable Colonel Armand to resist the shock; and his orders were positive to maintain his ground against the cavalry, whatever their numbers might be.[32]

[Footnote 32:  Journal of Colonel Williams.]

At the time of communicating these orders to Colonel Otho H. Williams, the Deputy Adjutant General, Gates, showed him a rough estimate of the army, making it upwards of seven thousand.  Convinced that this estimate was exaggerated, Colonel Williams availed himself of his means of information to make an abstract of the whole, which he presented to the general, and which exhibited exactly three thousand and fifty-two in the column of present fit for duty, of whom more than two-thirds were militia.  Gates expressed some surprise at the numbers, but said, “there are enough for our purpose,” and directed the orders to be issued to the army.  About ten at night, the line of march was taken up, and the army had advanced about half way to Camden, when a firing commenced in front.[33]