The opinion of the general officers was required on the course now to be pursued.  General Lee, who had been lately exchanged, and whose experience gave great weight to his opinions, was vehement against risking either a general or partial engagement.  The British army was computed at ten thousand effective men, and that of the Americans amounted to between ten and eleven thousand.  General Lee was decidedly of opinion that, with such an equality of force, it would be “criminal” to hazard an action.  He relied much on the advantageous ground on which their late foreign connexions had placed the United States, and contended that defeat alone could now endanger their independence.  To this he said the army ought not to be exposed.  It would be impossible he thought to bring on a partial action, without risking its being made general, should such be the choice of the enemy, since the detachment which might engage must be supported, or be cut to pieces.  A general action ought not to be fought unless the advantage was manifestly with the American army.  This at present was not the case.  He attributed so much to the superior discipline of the enemy as to be of opinion that the issue of the engagement would be, almost certainly, unfavourable.

General Du Portail, a French officer of considerable reputation, maintained the same opinions; and the Baron de Steuben concurred in them.  The American officers seem to have been influenced by the councils of the Europeans; and, of seventeen generals, only Wayne and Cadwallader were decidedly in favour of attacking the enemy.  Lafayette appeared inclined to that opinion without openly embracing it; and General Greene was inclined to hazard more than the councils of the majority would sanction.  The country, he thought, must be protected; and if, in doing so, an engagement should become unavoidable, it would be necessary to fight.

[Sidenote:  The British army evacuate Philadelphia and march through the Jerseys.]

On the morning of the 18th, Philadelphia was evacuated;[6] and, by two in the afternoon, all the British troops were encamped on the Jersey shore, from Cooper’s Creek to Red Bank.  Although they availed themselves to a great extent of the transportation by water, yet their line of march was so lengthened and encumbered by baggage, and the weather was so intensely hot, that they were under the necessity of proceeding slowly.  Indeed their movements wore the appearance of purposed delay; and were calculated to favour the opinion that Sir Henry Clinton was willing to be overtaken, and wished for a general engagement.

[Footnote 6:  As the British army moved down Second street, Captain M’Lane, with a few light horse and one hundred infantry, entered the city, and cut off, and captured one Captain, one Provost Marshal, one guide to the army, and thirty privates, without losing a man.]

As his line of march, until he passed Crosswicks, led directly up the Delaware, General Washington found it necessary to make an extensive circuit, and to cross the river at Coryell’s Ferry; after which he kept possession of the high grounds in Jersey, thereby retaining the choice of bringing on, or avoiding an action.