“That the minister plenipotentiary of these states at the court of Versailles, the minister of France in Pennsylvania, and the minister of France, be respectively informed that the operations of the next campaign must depend on such a variety of contingencies to arise, as well from our own internal circumstances and resources, as the progress and movements of our enemy, that time alone can mature and point out the plan which ought to be pursued.  That congress, therefore, can not, with a degree of confidence answerable to the magnitude of the object, decide on the practicability of their co-operating the next campaign, in an enterprise for the emancipation of Canada; that every preparation in our power will nevertheless be made for acting with vigour against the common enemy, and every favourable incident embraced with alacrity, to facilitate, and hasten the freedom and independence of Canada, and her union with these states—­events which congress, from motives of policy with respect to the United States, as well as of affection for their Canadian brethren, have greatly at heart.”

Mr. de Sevelinges in his introduction to Botta’s History, recites the private instructions given to Mr. Girard on his mission to the United States.  One article was, “to avoid entering into any formal engagement relative to Canada and other English possessions which congress proposed to conquer.”  Mr. de Sevelinges adds that “the policy of the cabinet of Versailles viewed the possession of those countries, especially of Canada by England, as a principle of useful inquietude and vigilance to the Americans.  The neighbourhood of a formidable enemy must make them feel more sensibly the price which they ought to attach to the friendship and support of the king of France.”

The author has reason to believe that this policy was known to the Marquis de Lafayette when his devotion to the interests of the United States induced him to add his influence to their solicitations for aid to this enterprise.

NOTE—­No.  III. See Page 233

A letter to President Reed of Pennsylvania from which the following extracts are taken, is selected from many others written with the same view.

“Morristown, May 28th, 1780.

“DEAR SIR,—­I am much obliged to you for your favour of the 23d.  Nothing could be more necessary than the aid given by your state towards supplying us with provisions.  I assure you, every idea you can form of our distresses, will fall short of the reality.  There is such a combination of circumstances to exhaust the patience of the soldiery, that it begins at length to be worn out, and we see in every line of the army, the most serious features of mutiny and sedition:  all our departments, all our operations are at a stand; and unless a system very different from that which has for a long time prevailed, be immediately adopted throughout the states, our affairs must soon become desperate beyond the