[Sidenote:  1781 January 14.]

[Sidenote:  Sixteenth.]

The combined movements of the British army were communicated to General Morgan on the 14th of January.  Perceiving the insecurity of his own position, he retired across the Pacolet, the fords over which he was desirous of defending.  But a passage of that river being effected at a ford about six miles below him, he made a precipitate retreat; and, on the evening of the same day, his pursuers occupied the camp he had abandoned.  Morgan retired to the Cowpens, where he determined to risk a battle.  It was believed that he might have crossed the Broad River, or have reached a mountainous country which was also near him, before he could have been overtaken; and the superiority of his adversary was so decided as to induce his best officers to think that every effort ought to be made to avoid an engagement.  But Morgan had great and just confidence in himself and in his troops; he was unwilling to fly from an enemy not so decidedly his superior as to render it madness to fight him; and he also thought that, if he should be overtaken while his men were fatigued and retreating, the probability of success would be much less than if he should exhibit the appearance of fighting from choice.

These considerations determined him to halt earlier than was absolutely necessary.[56]

[Footnote 56:  These reasons for his conduct were given to the author by General Morgan soon after his return from the southern campaign.]

[Sidenote:  Battle of the Cowpens.]

Tarlton, having left his baggage under a strong guard, with orders not to move until break of day, recommenced the pursuit at three in the morning.

Before day, Morgan was informed of his approach, and prepared to receive him.

Although censured by many for having determined to fight, and by some for the ground he chose, all admit the judgment with which his disposition was made.

On an eminence, in an open wood, he drew up his continental troops, and Triplet’s corps, deemed equal to continentals, amounting to between four and five hundred men, who were commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Howard.  In their rear, on the descent of the hill, Lieutenant Colonel Washington was posted with his cavalry, and a small body of mounted Georgia militia commanded by Major M’Call, as a corps de reserve.  On these two corps rested his hopes of victory, and with them he remained in person.  The front line was composed entirely of militia, under the command of Colonel Pickens.  Major M’Dowell, with a battalion of North Carolina volunteers, and Major Cunningham, with a battalion of Georgia volunteers, were advanced about one hundred and fifty yards in front of this line, with orders to give a single fire as the enemy approached, and then to fall back into the intervals, which were left for them in the centre of the first line.  The militia, not being expected to maintain their ground long, were ordered to keep up a retreating fire by regiments, until they should pass the continental troops, on whose right they were directed again to form.  His whole force, as stated by himself, amounted to only eight hundred men.