by holding their commissions, and the men were continually fluctuating, to maintain discipline was impossible.  Nothing could be more obvious to him than that a sound military establishment and real economy were the same.  That the purposes of war would be greatly promoted by it was too clear to admit of argument.  He objected also to the mode of effecting the reduction.  This was by leaving it to the several states to select the officers who should remain in service.  He regretted that congress had not thought proper to retain the reduction and incorporation of the regiments under their own discretion.  He regretted that it should be left to the states, not only because it was an adherence to the state system, which in the arrangements of the army, he disapproved; but because also he feared it would introduce much confusion and discontent in a business which ought to be conducted with the greatest circumspection.  He feared also that professing to select the officers to be retained in service would give disgust both to those who should be discontinued, and to those who should remain.  The former would be sent away under the public stigma of inferior merit, and the latter would feel no pleasure in a present preference, when they reflected that, at some future period, they might experience a similar fate.

He wished with much sincerity that congress had been pleased to make no alteration in the term of service, but had confined their requisition to men who should serve for the war, to be raised by enlistment, draught, or assessment, as might be found necessary.  As it now stood, there would be very few men for the war, and all the evils of temporary engagements would still be felt.  In the present temper of the states, he entertained the most flattering hopes that they would enter on vigorous measures to raise an army for the war, if congress appeared decided respecting it; but if they held up a different idea as admissible, it would be again concluded that they did not think an army for the war essential.  This would encourage the opposition of men of narrow, interested, and feeble tempers, and enable them to defeat the primary object of the revolution.

This letter was taken into consideration; and the measures it recommended were pursued in almost every particular.  Even the two great principles which were viewed with most jealousy,—­an army for the war, and half pay for life,—­were adopted.  It would have greatly abridged the calamities of America, could these resolutions have been carried into execution.  Every effort for the purpose was made by the Commander-in-chief.

To place the officers of the army in a situation which would render their commissions valuable, and hold out to them the prospect of a comfortable old age, in a country saved by their blood, their sufferings, and the labours of their best years, was an object which had always been dear to the heart of General Washington, and he had seized every opportunity to press it on congress.  That body had approached it slowly, taking step after step with apparent reluctance, as the necessity of the measure became more and more obvious.