Private letters disclose the fact that two parties still agitated congress.  One entered fully into the views of the Commander-in-chief.  The other, jealous of the army, and apprehensive of its hostility to liberty when peace should be restored, remained unwilling to give stability to its constitution by increasing the numbers who were to serve during the war.  They seemed to dread the danger from the enemy to which its fluctuations would expose them, less than the danger which might be apprehended for the civil authority from its permanent character.  They caught with avidity at every intelligence which encouraged the flattering hope of a speedy peace,[49] but entered reluctantly into measures founded on the supposition that the war might be of long duration.  Perfectly acquainted with the extent of the jealousies entertained on this subject, although, to use his own expressions to a friend, “Heaven knows how unjustly,” General Washington had foreborne to press the necessity of regular and timely reinforcements to his army so constantly and so earnestly as his own judgment directed.  But the experience of every campaign furnished such strong additional evidences of the impolicy and danger of continuing to rely on temporary expedients, and the uncertainty of collecting a force to co-operate with the auxiliaries from France was so peculiarly embarrassing, that he at length resolved to conquer the delicacy by which he had been in some degree restrained, and to open himself fully on the subject which he deemed more essential than any other to the success of the war.

[Footnote 49:  The following extract from a private letter of General Washington to a member of congress, shows how sensible he was of the mischief produced by this temper.  “The satisfaction I have in any successes that attend us, even in the alleviation of misfortunes, is always allayed by the fear that it will lull us into security.  Supineness, and a disposition to flatter ourselves, seem to make parts of our national character.  When we receive a check and are not quite undone, we are apt to fancy we have gained a victory; and when we do gain any little advantage, we imagine it decisive, and expect the war immediately to end.  The history of the war is a history of false hopes and temporary expedients.  Would to God they were to end here!  This winter, if I am not mistaken, will open a still more embarrassing scene than we have yet experienced, to the southward.  I have little doubt, should we not gain a naval superiority, that Sir Henry Clinton will detach to the southward to extend his conquests.  I am far from being satisfied that we shall be prepared to repel his attempts.”]

[Sidenote:  August.]

In August, while looking anxiously for such a reinforcement to the Chevalier de Tunay as would give him the command of the American seas, and while uncertain whether the campaign might not pass away without giving a single advantage promised at its opening, he transmitted a letter to congress, fully and freely imparting his sentiments on the state of things.