This plan was committed to Major General the Marquis de la Fayette, who was authorized to explain the situation of the American army, and the views of the General, to the Count de Rochambeau.  It was to be considered as preliminary to any operation—­that the fleet and army of France should continue their aid until the enterprise should succeed, or be abandoned by mutual consent.

The Chevalier de Tunay did not long maintain his superiority at sea.  Three days after he reached Newport, Admiral Greaves arrived with six ships of the line, and transferred it to the British.  On his appearance off the Hook, Arbuthnot passed the bar with four ships of the line; and hearing that De Tunay had reached Rhode Island, proceeded thither, and cruised off the harbour.  The Count de Rochambeau had been put into possession of all the forts and batteries about Newport, and the fleet had been moved in a line so as to co-operate with the land forces.  This position appearing too formidable to be attempted by the fleet alone, Arbuthnot continued to cruise off Block Island.

As the commanders of the allied forces still cherished the hope of acquiring a superiority at sea, the design on New York was only suspended.  This hope was strengthened by intelligence that the Count de Guichen had been joined in the West Indies by a powerful Spanish armament.  The Chevalier de Tunay had despatched a packet to inform him that he was blocked up by a superior force, and to solicit such reinforcements as the situation of the Count might enable him to spare.  Relying on the success of this application, and on the arrival of the second division of the squadron from Brest, the American general impatiently expected the moment when De Tunay would be enabled to act offensively.

In this crisis of affairs, a derangement took place in a most important department, which threatened to disconcert the whole plan of operations, though every other circumstance should prove favourable.

The immense expenditure of the quartermaster’s department—­the inadequacy of the funds with which it was supplied—­the reciprocal disgusts and complaints produced by these causes, had determined congress to make still another radical change in the system.  This subject had been taken up early in the winter; but such were the delays inseparable from the proceedings of the government, that the report of the committee was not made until the month of March, nor finally decided on until the middle of July.

This subject was too interesting to the army, and to the important operations meditated for the campaign, not to engage the anxious attention of the Commander-in-chief.  At his request, the quartermaster general, while the army lay in winter quarters, repaired to Philadelphia for the purpose of giving congress all the information he possessed.  He proposed to withdraw the management of the department almost entirely from the civil government, and to place it under the control of the person who should be at its head, subject only to the direction of the Commander-in-chief.