offer of new evidence was not during the trial.  The trial was over; the verdict was actually delivered to the Judge; there was also an appearance that the discovery of the actual finding had suggested to the plaintiff the production of new evidence.  Yet it appeared to the Judges so strong a measure to refuse evidence, whilst any, even formal, appearance remained that the trial was not closed, that they sent a Judge from the bench into the Common Pleas to obtain the opinion of their brethren there, before they could venture to take upon them to consider the time for production of evidence as elapsed.  The case of refusal, taken with its circumstances, is full as strong an example in favor of the report of the Judges in Lord Strafford’s case as any precedent of admittance can be.

The researches of your Committee not having furnished them with any cases in which evidence has been rejected during the trial, as being out of time, we have found some instances in which it has been actually received,—­and received not to repel any new matter in the prisoner’s defence, but when the prisoner had called all his witnesses, and thereby closed his defence.  A remarkable instance occurred on the trial of Harrison for the murder of Dr. Clenche.  The Justices who tried the cause, viz., Lord Chief-Justice Holt, and the Justices Atkins and Nevil, admitted the prosecutor to call new evidence, for no other reason but that a new witness was then come into court, who had not been in court before.[81] These Justices apparently were of the same opinion on this point with the Justices who gave their opinion in the case of Lord Stafford.

Your Committee, on this point, as on the former, cannot discover any authority for the decision of the House of Lords in the Law of Parliament, or in the law practice of any court in this kingdom.

PRACTICE BELOW.

Your Committee, not having learned that the resolutions of the Judges (by which the Lords have been guided) were supported by any authority in law to which they could have access, have heard by rumor that they have been justified upon the practice of the courts in ordinary trials by commission of Oyer and Terminer.  To give any legal precision to this term of practice, as thus applied, your Committee apprehends it must mean, that the judge in those criminal trials has so regularly rejected a certain kind of evidence, when offered there, that it is to be regarded in the light of a case frequently determined by legal authority.  If such had been discovered, though your Committee never could have allowed these precedents as rules for the guidance of the High Court of Parliament, yet they should not be surprised to see the inferior judges forming their opinions on their own confined practice.  Your Committee, in their inquiry, has found comparatively few reports of criminal trials, except the collection under the title of “State