the will were set aside, he would be liable to answer for damages incurred by the sale of the deceased’s chambers to a Mr. Frederick.  Mr. Frederick offered to submit to a rule to release, for the sake of public justice.  Those who maintained the objection cited Siderfin, a reporter of much authority, 51, 115, and 1st Keble, 134.  Lord Mansfield, Chief-Justice, did not controvert those authorities; but in the course of obtaining substantial justice he treated both of them with equal contempt, though determined by judges of high reputation.  His words are remarkable:  “We do not now sit here to take our rules of evidence from Siderfin and Keble.”  He overruled the objection upon more recent authorities, which, though not in similar circumstances, he considered as within the reason.  The Court did not think it necessary that the witness should release, as he had offered to do.  “It appeared on this trial,” says Justice Blackstone, “that a black conspiracy was formed to set aside the gentleman’s will, without any foundation whatever.”  A prosecution against three of the testamentary witnesses was recommended, who were afterwards convicted of perjury.[62] Had strict formalities with regard to evidence been adhered to in any part of this proceeding, that very black conspiracy would have succeeded, and those black conspirators, instead of receiving the punishment of their crimes, would have enjoyed the reward of their perjury.

Lord Mansfield, it seems, had been misled, in a certain case, with regard to precedents.  His opinion was against the reason and equity of the supposed practice, but he supposed himself not at liberty to give way to his own wishes and opinions.  On discovering his error, he considered himself as freed from an intolerable burden, and hastened to undo his former determination.  “There are no precedents,” said he, with some exultation, “which stand in the way of our determining liberally, equitably, and according to the true intention of the parties.”  In the same case, his learned assessor, Justice Wilmot, felt the same sentiments.  His expressions are remarkable:—­“Courts of law ought to concur with courts of equity in the execution of those powers which are very convenient to be inserted in settlements; and they ought not to listen to nice distinctions that savor of the schools, but to be guided by true good sense and manly reason.  After the Statute of Uses, it is much to be lamented that the courts of Common Law had not adopted all the rules and maxims of courts of equity.  This would have prevented the absurdity of receiving costs in one court and paying them in another."[63]