It is further remarkable, in this judicial argument, that exceptions are allowed not only to rules of evidence, but that the rules of evidence themselves are not altogether the same, where the subject-matter varies.  The Judges have, to facilitate justice, and to favor commerce, even adopted the rules of foreign laws.  They have taken for granted, and would not suffer to be questioned, the regularity and justice of the proceedings of foreign courts; and they have admitted them as evidence, not only of the fact of the decision, but of the right as to its legality.  “Where there are foreign parties interested, and in commercial matters, the rules of evidence are not quite the same as in other instances in courts of justice:  the case of Hue and Cry, Brownlow, 47.  A feme covert is not a lawful witness against her husband, except in cases of treason, but has been admitted in civil cases.[53] The testimony of a public notary is evidence by the law of France:  contracts are made before a public notary, and no other witness necessary.  I should think it would be no doubt at all, if it came in question here, whether this would be a valid contract, but a testimony from persons of that credit and reputation would be received as a very good proof in foreign transactions, and would authenticate the contract."[54]

These cases show that courts always govern themselves by these rules in cases of foreign transactions.  To this principle Lord Hardwicke accords; and enlarging the rule of evidence by the nature of the subject and the exigencies of the case, he lays it down, “that it is a common and natural presumption, that persons of the Gentoo religion should be principally apprised of facts and transactions in their own country.  As the English have only a factory in this country, (for it is in the empire of the Great Mogul,) if we should admit this evidence [Gentoo evidence on a Gentoo oath], it would be agreeable to the genius of the law of England.”  For this he cites the proceedings of our Court of Admiralty, and adopts the author who states the precedent, “that this Court will give credit to the sentence of the Court of Admiralty in France, and take it to be according to right, and will not examine their proceedings:  for it would be found very inconvenient, if one kingdom should, by peculiar laws, correct the judgments and proceedings of another kingdom.”  Such is the genius of the law of England, that these two principles, of the general moral necessities of things, and the nature of the case, overrule every other principle, even those rules which seem the very strongest.  Chief-Baron Parker, in answer to an objection made against the infidel deponent, “that the plaintiff ought to have shown that he could not have the evidence of Christians,” says, “that, repugnant to natural justice, in the Statute of Hue and Cry, the robbed is admitted to be witness of the robbery, as a moral or presumed necessity is sufficient.”  The same learned magistrate, pursuing his argument