After Mr. Hastings had conferred absolute power upon himself during his stay in the upper provinces by an order of Council, (of which Council he was himself a majority,) he entered the following minute in the Consultations.  “The Governor-General delivers in the following minute.  In my minute which I laid before the court on the 21st May, I expressed the satisfaction with which I could at this juncture leave the Presidency, from the mutual confidence which was happily established between Mr. Wheler and me.  I now readily repeat that sentiment, and observe with pleasure that Mr. Wheler confirms it.  Before my departure, it is probable that we shall in concert have provided at the board for almost every important circumstance that can eventually happen during my absence; but if any should occur for which no previous provision shall have been made in the resolutions of the board, Mr. Wheler may act with immediate decision, and with the fullest confidence of my support, in all such emergencies, as well as in conducting the ordinary business of the Presidency, and in general in all matters of this government, excepting those which may specially or generally be intrusted to me.  Mr. Wheler during my absence may consider himself as possessed of the full powers of the Governor-General and Council of this government, as in effect he is by the constitution; and he may be assured, that, so far as my sanction and concurrence shall be, or be deemed, necessary to the confirmation of his measures, he shall receive them.”

Now here is a compact of iniquity between these two duumvirs.  They each give to the other the full, complete, and perfect powers of the government; and in order to secure themselves against any obstacles that might arise, they mutually engage to ratify each other’s acts:  and they say this is not illegal, because Lord Cornwallis has had such a deputation.  I must first beg leave to observe that no man can justify himself in doing any illegal act by its having been done by another; much less can he justify his own illegal act by pleading an act of the same kind done subsequently to his act, because the latter may have been done in consequence of his bad example.  Men justify their acts in two ways,—­by law and by precedent; the former asserts the right, the latter presumes it from the example of others.  But can any man justify an act, because ten or a dozen years after another man has done the same thing?  Good heavens! was there ever such a doctrine before heard?  Suppose Lord Cornwallis to have done wrong; suppose him to have acted illegally; does that clear the prisoner at your bar?  No:  on the contrary, it aggravates his offence; because he has afforded others an example of corrupt and illegal conduct.  But if even Lord Cornwallis had preceded, instead of following him, the example would not have furnished a justification.  There is no resemblance in the cases.  Lord Cornwallis does not hold his government by the act of 1773, but by a special act made afterwards;