It has been said that if Von Kluck had won the French capital, as it seemed he might, the French could not have gained the Battle of the Marne, and the result of the war might have been very different.  It was, however, no mistake on the part of Von Kluck, no false maneuver on his part, that determined the victory of the Marne.  Von Kluck did exactly what he ought to have done; the decision taken by the German General Staff was exactly what it ought to have taken, and what was foreseen during the whole course of the war.

It was on September 4, 1914, in the morning, that the observations made by the French cavalry, as well as by British aviators and those of the army of Manoury and the military government of Paris, made it clear that the German right (Von Kluck’s army) was bending its march toward the southeast in the direction of Meaux and Coulommiers, leaving behind it the road to Paris.

At this moment the Fifth French’ Army of the left was ready to meet the German forces in a frontal attack, and it was flanked toward the northwest by the British army and by General Manoury’s army to the northeast of the capital.

The disposition of forces aimed at in General Joffre’s order of August 25 was thus accomplished; the French escaped the turning movement, and they were in a position to counter with an enveloping movement themselves.  The wings of the French forces found support in their maneuvering in their contact with the strongholds of Paris and Verdun.  Immediately the commander in chief decided to attack, and issued on the evening of September 4 the series of general orders, given as an appendix to this volume, which announced the big offensive and eventually turned the tide of battle.

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CHAPTER XV

GERMAN RETREAT

That morning of the 8th, then, saw General von Kluck in full retreat.  His frontal attack on General d’Esperey had failed and the Fifth French Army had advanced.  The British were at his flank, and besides, they had been able to spare some of their heavy artillery to send to the Sixth Army under General Maunoury, to enable him to cross the Ourcq.  It is by no means certain that even with this assistance could the Sixth Army have silenced the terrible fire of those howitzers, but General von Kluck dared no longer leave his artillery there, it must be taken with him on his retreat, or become valuable booty.  Leaving a few batteries to guard the crossings of the river, the Ourcq division of the German right retreated in good order, to rejoin their comrades who had been so unexpectedly mauled by the British.  The honor of this day was, curiously, not to the victorious, but to the defeated army.  Had General von Kluck done nothing other than conduct his army in retreat as he did, he would have shown himself an able commander.  Sir John French and General d’Esperey followed