In this engagement between the British and the German right, all the odds had been in favor of the British, and success meant merely the grasping at opportunities that presented themselves.  Still, by constantly striking at General van Kluck’s exposed flank, his frontal attack of General d’Esperey was so weakened, that, toward evening at the close of two days of continuous and very severe fighting, the Fifth French Army was able to advance and hold the position from La Ferte-Gaucher to Esternay.  The ground gained was valuable but not essential, yet it made a profound impression.

General d’Esperey’s step forward was the Germans’ step back.  It meant that the road to Paris was barred.  How fully this was realized may be seen from an order signed by Lieutenant General Tuelff von Tschepe und Weidenbach and found in the house that had been occupied by the staff of the Eighth German Army Corps when the victorious French entered Vitry-le-Francois.  The order was dated “September 7, 10:30 p. m.” and it read as follows: 

“The object of our long and arduous marches has been achieved.  The principal French troops have been forced to accept battle, after having been continually forced back.  The great decision is undoubtedly at hand.  To-morrow, therefore, the whole strength of the German army, as well as all that of our Army Corps, are bound to be engaged all along the line from Paris to Verdun.  To save the welfare and the honor or Germany I expect every officer and man, notwithstanding the hard and heroic fights of the last few days, to do his duty unswervingly and to the last breath.  Everything depends on the result of to-morrow.”

Much did, indeed, depend on the result of the morrow, and for the third day, again, it was General von Kluck’s initial move that brought disaster to the German side.

Why was it that Von Kluck, instead of marching directly on Paris, as would have been expected, made a detour, having as his object not the capital but the French army?  It may be said in favor of it that the decision taken by the German General Staff was in conformity with the military doctrine of Napoleon.  According to this doctrine, a capital, whatever its importance, is never more than an accessory object, geographical or political.  What is of importance is the strategical object.  The strategical object is the essential, the geographical object is only accessory.  Once the essential object is attained, the accessory object is acquired of itself.  Once the French armies had been beaten, thrown back, and dispersed, Von Kluck could return to the capital and take it easily.

Conceive of him, on the other hand, attacking the capital with the army of Manoury on his right, which constituted a serious menace to his left, and in front or him the British army and the Fifth French Army; he might have been caught as in a vise between these forces while all his activity was being absorbed by his attack on the intrenchments around Paris.