This first apparent solution had the evident advantage of abandoning to the enemy no part of the national soil, but it had some serious inconveniences.  The attack of the German armies operating on the right (Generals von Kluck, von Buelow, von Hausen) were extremely menacing.  In order to parry this attack it was necessary considerably to reenforce the French left, and for that purpose to transfer from the right to the left a certain number of army corps.  That is what the military call, in the language of chess players, “to castle” the army corps.  But this movement could not be accomplished in a few hours.  It required, even with all the perfection of organization shown by the French railways during this war, a certain number of days.  As long as this operation from the right to the left had not been accomplished, as long as the left wing of the French army and even the center remained without the reenforcement of elements taken from the right, it would have been extremely imprudent, not to say rash, for the French high command to attempt a decisive battle.  If General Joffre had risked a battle immediately he would have been playing the game without all his trumps in hand and would have been in danger of a defeat, and even of a decided disaster, from which it might have been impossible to recover.

The second alternative consisted in drawing back and in profiting from a retreat by putting everything in shipshape order to bring about a new grouping of forces.  They would allow the Germans to advance, and when the occasion showed itself favorable the French armies, along with the British army, would take the offensive and wage a decisive battle.

It was to this second decision that General Joffre came.  As soon as on August 25, 1914, he had made up his mind as to what the French retreat was going to lead he gave orders for a new marshaling of forces and for preparations with a view to the offensive.

General Joffre has made no objection to the publication of his orders in detail from that date, August 25, 1914, down to the Battle of the Marne.  They constitute an eloquent and convincing document.  The series of orders were contained in the “Bulletin des Armees de la Republique Francaise,” June 6, 1915, Sunday.  The first of these orders, dated August 25, 1914, runs as follows: 

“The projected offensive movement not having been found possible of execution, the consequent operations will be so conducted as to put in line, on our left, by the junction of the Fourth and Fifth Armies, the British army, and new forces recruited from the eastern district, a body capable of taking the offensive while other armies for the needed interval hold in check the efforts of the enemy....”

The retreating movement was regulated so as to bring about the following disposition of forces preparatory to an offensive: 

“In the Amiens district a new grouping of forces, formed of elements conveyed by rail (Seventh Corps, four divisions of reserve, and perhaps another active army corps), brought together from August 27 to September 2, 1914.  This body will remain ready to take the offensive in the general direction of St. Pol-Arras or Arras-Bapaume.”