In the French army the number of noncommissioned officers by profession totaled hardly half the German figures.  The German army, moreover, was much more abundantly supplied with machine guns than the French.  The Germans had almost twice as many, and they understood how to use them in defense and attack better than the French.  They had moreover, to a degree far superior to that of the French, studied the use of fortifications in the field, trenches, wire entanglements, and so on.  The Germans were also at first better trained than the French reservists; they had spent langer periods in the German army, and their reserve carps were almost equal to the active carps.

In the French army, on the other hand, an apprenticeship and training of several weeks were required to give to the divisions of reserve their full worth.  At the end of two weeks, nevertheless, thanks to the marvelous elasticity of the French soldier and the warlike qualities of the race, the training was completed.  At the beginning of the month of September the reserve divisions fought with the same skill, the same keenness, and the same swing as the active army carps.

Moreover, certain incompetencies had revealed themselves in the French high command.  These General Jaffre attended to without the loss of an instant.  Every general that appeared to him incapable of fulfilling the task allotted to him was weeded out on the spot, without considering friendships or the bonds of comradeship, or intimacy that might be between them.

As things were seen in Paris, all may be summed up in this formula:  That the German army was better prepared for war than the French army, for the simple reason that Germany had long prepared for the war, because she had it in view, a thing which could not be said of France.  But the French army revealed right from the beginning the most admirable and marvelous qualities.  The soldiers fought with a skill and heroism that have never been equaled.  Sometimes, indeed, their enthusiasm and courage carried them too far.  It mattered little.  In spite of losses, in spite even of retreat, the morale of the whole French army on the entire front from Alsace to the Somme remained extraordinarily high.

The violation of Belgian neutrality and the passage of the German armies through Belgium had been foreseen by the French General Staff, but opinions differed in regard to the breadth of the turning movement likely to be made by the German right wing in crossing Belgian territory.  Among French experts some were of opinion that the Germans would confine themselves to the right bank of the Meuse, while others thought that they would cross the Meuse, and make a much vaster turning movement, thus descending on France in a direction due north and south.

If the violation of Belgian neutrality was no surprise to the French Staff, it was nevertheless hardly expected that the Germans would be able to put in line with such rapidity at the outset all their reserve formations.  Each army corps was supported by its reserve corps, which showed itself as quick in mobilization and preparation as the active corps.