[Illustration:  Battle of Mons and retreat of allied armies]

While the night attack on Landrecies was raging, the Germans, taxing their men to the uttermost, marched four other corps through the tract of country between the west side of the forest and the road from Valenciennes to Cambrai.  These corps were in a position along Smith-Dorrien’s front before dawn of Wednesday, August, 26, 1914, and in the earliest hours of the morning it became apparent that the Germans were determined to throw the bulk of their strength against the British battalions which had moved up to a position south of the small town of Solesmes, extending to the south of Cambrai.  Thus placed, this force could shield the Second Corps, now beginning its retreat under pressure of the German army advancing from Tournai.  These troops under General Snow were destined to play an important part in the impending battle of Le Cateau.

By sunrise the guns of the four German corps were firing from positions facing the British left, and gray-green masses of infantry were pressing forward in dense firing lines.  In view of this attack, General Smith-Dorrien judged it impossible to continue his retreat at daybreak.  The First Corps was at that moment scarcely out of difficulty, and General Sordet—­whose troops had been fighting hard on the flank of the Fifth French Army, with General Lanrezac, against General von Buelow’s hosts—­was unable to help the British, owing to the exhausted state of his cavalry.  The situation was full of peril; indeed, Wednesday bade fair to become the most critical day of the retreat.

As the day of August 26, 1914, wore on, General von Kluck, abandoning frontal attacks, began to use his superior numbers in a great enveloping move on both flanks, and some of his batteries secured positions from which they could enfilade the British line.  Smith-Dorrien, having no available reserves, was thus virtually ringed by enemy guns on one side and by hostile infantry on all sides.  “It became apparent,” says Sir John French’s dispatch, “that if complete annihilation was to be avoided, a retirement must be attempted; and the order was given to commence it about 3.30 p.m.  The movement was covered with the most devoted intrepidity and determination by the artillery, which had suffered heavily, and the fine work done by the cavalry in the farther retreat from the position assisted materially in the completion of this difficult and dangerous operation.  The saving of the left wing could never have been accomplished unless a commander” (Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien) “of rare coolness had been present to personally conduct the operation.”