On August 15, 1914, Von Buelow’s vanguard came within sight of Namur.  Before evening German guns were hurling shells upon its forts.  Began then the siege of Namur.  Namur, being the second fortress hope of the Allies—­the pivot upon which General Joffre had planned to swing his army into Belgium in a sweeping attack upon the advancing Germans—­a brief survey of the city and fortifications will be necessary.  The situation of the city is not as imposing as that of Liege.  For the most part it sits on a hillside declivity, to rest in the angle formed by the junction of the Sambre and Meuse.  It is a place of some historic and industrial importance, though in the latter respect not so well known as Liege.  To the west, however, up the valley of the Sambre, the country presents the usual features of a mining region—­pit shafts, tall chimneys issuing clouds of black smoke, and huge piles of unsightly debris.  While away to the north stretches the great plain of Central Belgium, southward the Central Meuse offers a more picturesque prospect in wooded slopes rising to view-commanding hilltops.  Directly east, the Meuse flows into the precipitous cut on its way to Liege.

But in Belgian eyes the fame of Namur lay to a great extent in its being the second of Brialmont’s fortress masterpieces.  Its plan was that of Liege—­a ring of outer detached forts, constructed on the same armor-clad cupola principle.  At Namur these were nine in number, four major forts and five fortins.  The distance between each fort was on the average two and a half miles, with between two and a half to five miles from the city as the center of the circumference.

Facing Von Buelow’s advance, fort Cognlee protected the Brussels railway, while the guns of Marchovelette swept the space between it and the left bank of the Meuse.  In the southwest angle formed by the Meuse, forts Maizeret, Andoy and Dave continued the ring.  Again in the angle of the Sambre and Meuse forts St. Heribert and Malonne protected the city.  North of the Sambre, forts Suarlee and Emines completed the circle.

In the emergency Namur possessed one advantage over Liege.  The resistance of Liege gave Namur due warning of the German invasion, and some days to prepare for attack.  General Michel was in command or the garrison of Namur, which comprised from 25,000 to 30,000 men.  Doubtless reports had come to him of the situation at Liege.  He immediately set to work to overcome the cause of the failure of Brialmont’s plan at Liege, by constructing trenches between the forts, protected by barbed wire entanglements, and mines in advance of the German approach.  As his circumference of defense was less than that of Liege, his force promised to be capable of a more prolonged resistance.