The first thing he did was to form an ostensible council at Calcutta for the management of the revenues, which was not effectually bound, except it thought fit, to make any reference to the Supreme Council.  He delegated to them—­that is, to four covenanted servants—­those functions which by act of Parliament and the Company’s orders were to be exercised by the Council-General; he delegated to four gentlemen, creatures of his own, his own powers, but he laid them out to good interest.  It appears odd that one of the first acts to a Governor-General, so jealous of his power as he is known to be, as soon as he had all the power in his own hands, should be to put all the revenues out of his own control.  This upon the first view is an extraordinary proceeding.  His next step was, without apprising the Court of Directors of his intention, or without having given an idea of any such intention to his colleagues while alive, either those who died in India, or those who afterwards returned to Europe, in one day, in a moment, to annihilate the whole authority of the Provincial Councils, and delegate the whole power to these four gentlemen.

These four gentlemen had for their secretary an agent given them by Mr. Hastings:  a name that you will often hear of; a name at the sound of which all India turns pale; the most wicked, the most atrocious, the boldest, the most dexterous villain that ever the rank servitude of that country has produced.  My Lords, I am speaking with the most assured freedom, because there never was a friend of Mr. Hastings, there never was a foe of Mr. Hastings, there never was any human person, that ever differed on this occasion, or expressed any other idea of Gunga Govind Sing, the friend of Mr. Hastings, whom he intrusted with this important post.  But you shall hear, from the account given by themselves, what the Council thought of their functions, of their efficiency for the charge, and in whose hands that efficiency really was.  I beg, hope, and trust, that your Lordships will learn from the persons themselves who were appointed to execute the office their opinion of the real execution of it, in order that you may judge of the plan for which he destroyed the whole English administration in India.

“The Committee must have a dewan, or executive officer, call him by what name you please.  This man, in fact, has all the revenue paid at the Presidency at his disposal, and can, if he has any abilities, bring all the renters under contribution.  It is little advantage to restrain the Committee themselves from bribery or corruption, when their executive officer has the power of practising both undetected.  To display the arts employed by a native on such occasions would fill a volume.  He discovers the secret resources of the zemindars and renters, their enemies and competitors; and by the engines of hope and fear, raised upon these foundations, he can work them to his purpose.  The Committee, with the best intentions, best abilities, and steadiest application, must after all be a tool in the hands of their dewan.”