Lordships’ bar:  but being brought to your Lordships’ bar, the nation is committed to it, and the least appearance of uncertainty in our minds would disgrace us forever. Esto perpetua, has been said.  To the glory of this nation, much more be it said, Esto perpetua; and I will say, that, as we have raised and exhibited a theatre of justice which has excited the admiration of all Europe, there would be a sort of lustre in our infamy, and a splendor in the disgrace that we should bring upon ourselves, if we should, just at that moment, turn that theatre of our glory into a spectacle of dishonor beyond what has ever happened to any country of the world.

The Commons of Great Britain, whilst willing to keep a strong and firm hand over all those who represent them in any business, do at the same time encourage them in the prosecution of it, by allowing them a just discretion and latitude wherever their own orders have not marked a distinction.  I shall therefore go on with the more cheerful confidence, not only for the reasons that I have stated, but for another and material reason.  I know and am satisfied, that, in the nobleness of your judgment, you will always make a distinction between the person that gives the order and the organ that is to execute it.  The House of Commons know no such thing as indiscretion, imprudence, or impropriety:  it is otherwise with their instruments.  Your Lordships very well know, that, if you hear anything that shall appear to you to be regular, apt to bring forward the charge, just, prudent, cogent, you are to give it to the Commons of Great Britain in Parliament assembled; if you should hear from me (and it must be from me alone, and not from any other member of the Committee) anything that is unworthy of that situation, that comes feeble, weak, indigested, or ill-prepared, you are to attribute that to the instrument.  Your Lordships’ judgment would do this without my saying it.  But whilst I claim it on the part of the Commons for their dignity, I claim for myself the necessary indulgence that must be given to all weakness.  Your Lordships, then, will impute it where you would have imputed it without my desire.  It is a distinction you would naturally have made, and the rather because what is alleged by us at the bar is not the ground upon which you are to give judgment.  If not only I, but the whole body of managers, had made use of any such expressions as I made use of,—­even if the Commons of Great Britain in Parliament assembled, if the collective body of Parliament, if the voice of Europe, had used them,—­if we had spoken with the tongues of men and angels, you, in the seat of judicature, are not to regard what we say, but what we prove; you are to consider whether the charge is well substantiated, and proof brought out by legal inference and argument.  You know, and I am sure the habits of judging which your Lordships have acquired by sitting in judgment must better inform you than any other men, that the duties of life, in order to