True faith, then, possesses a principle by which it protests against abuses which it is sought to cloak under its name, and this protest comes at last to make itself heard.  Faith suppressed, the passions will remain, for in order to be a saint, it is not enough to be a sceptic.  The passions will look for other pretexts.  Will not the spirit of doubt offer them such pretexts?

It seems at first sight that doubt must promote toleration, since it does not allow any importance to be attached to opinions.  This is a specious conclusion, similar to that which placed in belief the source of intolerant passions.  Let us once more reflect a little.  The first effect of doubt is certainly to dispose the mind to leave a free course to all opinions; but disdain is not the way to respect, and only respect can give solid bases to the spirit of liberty.  Believers are in the eyes of the sceptic weak-minded persons, whom he treats at first with a gentle and patronizing compassion.  But these weak minds grow obstinate; the sceptic perceives that they do not bend before his superiority, and dare perhaps to consider themselves as his equals.  Then irritation arises, and, beneath the velvet paw, one feels the piercing of the claw.  The sceptic has in fact a dogma; he has but one, but one he has after all—­the negation of truth.  The faith of others is a protest against that single dogma on which he has concentrated all the powers of his conviction.  He is passionately in earnest for this negation; he feels himself the representative of an idea, of which he must secure the triumph.  Now come such surmisings as these:  “Here are men who think themselves the depositaries of truth!  These pretended believers—­may they not be hypocrites?” Place men so disposed in positions of power; let them be the masters of society; what will follow?  Beliefs are a cause of disturbances:  what seemed at first an innocent weakness, takes then the character of a dangerous madness.  For the politician, the temptation to extirpate this madness is not far off.  “What if we were to get rid of this troublesome source of agitation!  If we declared that the conscience of individuals belongs to the sovereign, what repose we should have in the State!  If we proclaimed the true modern dogma, namely, that there is no dogma; if silencing, in short, fanatics who are behind their age, we decreed that every belief is a crime and every manifestation of faith a revolt, what quiet in society!” The incline is slippery, and what shall hold back the sceptic who is descending it?

Faith carries with it the remedy for fanaticism, but where shall be found the remedy for the fanaticism of doubt?  In the claims of God?  God is but a word, or a worthless hypothesis.  In respect for the convictions of others?  All conviction is but weakness and folly.  All this, be well assured, gives much matter for reflection.  When I hear some men who call themselves liberal, tracing the ideal of the society which they desire, the bare imagination of their triumph frightens me, for I can understand that that society would enjoy the liberty of the Roman empire, and the toleration of the Caesars.