under censure, it will be impracticable; because the first act must originate there.  The reduced state of the authority of this kingdom in Bengal may be traced in a great measure to that very natural source of independence.  In many cases the instant removal of an offender from his power of doing mischief is the only mode of preventing the utter and perhaps irretrievable ruin of public affairs.  In such a case the process ought to be simple, and the power absolute in one or in either hand separately.  By contriving the balance of interests formed in the act, notorious offence, gross error, or palpable insufficiency have many chances of retaining and abusing authority, whilst the variety of representations, hearings, and conferences, and possibly the mere jealousy and competition between rival powers, may prevent any decision, and at length give time and means for settlements and compromises among parties, made at the expense of justice and true policy.  But this act of 1780, not properly distinguishing judicial process from executive arrangements, requires in effect nearly the same degree of solemnity, delay, and detail for removing a political inconvenience which attends a criminal proceeding for the punishment of offences.  It goes further, and gives the same tenure to all who shall succeed to vacancies which was given to those whom the act found in office.

[Sidenote:  Provisional appointment for vacancies.]

Another regulation was made in the act, which has a tendency to render the control of delinquency or the removal of incapacity in the Council-General extremely difficult, as well as to introduce many other abuses into the original appointment of Counsellors.  The inconveniences of a vacancy in that important office, at a great distance from the authority that is to fill it, were visible; but your Committee have doubts whether they balance the mischief which may arise from the power given in this act, of a provisional appointment to vacancies, not on the event, but on foresight.  This mode of providing for the succession has a tendency to promote cabal, and to prevent inquiry into the qualifications of the persons to be appointed.  An attempt has been actually made, in consequence of this power, in a very marked manner, to confound the whole order and discipline of the Company’s service.  Means are furnished thereby for perpetuating the powers of some given Court of Directors.  They may forestall the patronage of their successors, on whom they entail a line of Supreme Counsellors and Governors-General.  And if the exercise of this power should happen in its outset to fall into bad hands, the ordinary chances for mending an ill choice upon death or resignation are cut off.

In these provisional arrangements it is to be considered that the appointment is not in consequence of any marked event which calls strongly on the attention of the public, but is made at the discretion of those who lead in the Court of Directors, and may therefore be brought forward at times the most favorable to the views of partiality and corruption.  Candidates have not, therefore, the notice that may be necessary for their claims; and as the possession of the office to which the survivors are to succeed seems remote, all inquiry into the qualifications and character of those who are to fill it will naturally be dull and languid.