If that had been his opinion, he ought to have resigned, and not disobeyed:  because it was not necessary that he should hold his office; but it was necessary, that, whilst he hold it, he should obey his superiors, and submit to the law.  Much more truly was his conduct a virtual resignation of his lawful office, and at the same time an usurpation of a situation which did not belong to him, to hold a subordinate office, and to refuse to act according to its duties.  Had his authority been self-originated, it would have been wounded by his submission; but in this case the true nature of his authority was affirmed, not injured, by his obedience, because it was a power derived from others, and, by its essence, to be executed according to their directions.

In this determined disobedience he was supported by Mr. Barwell, who on that occasion delivered the dangerous doctrine to which your Committee have lately adverted.  Mr. Fowke, who had a most material interest in this determination, applied by letter to be informed concerning it.  An answer was sent, acquainting him coldly, and without any reason assigned, of what had been resolved relative to his office.  This communication was soon followed by another letter from Mr. Fowke, with great submission and remarkable decency asserting his right to his office under the authority of the Court of Directors, and for solid reasons, grounded on the Company’s express orders, praying to be informed of the charge against him.  This letter appears to have been received by Mr. Hastings and Mr. Barwell very loftily.  Mr. Hastings said, “that such applications were irregular; that they are not accountable to Mr. Fowke for their resolution respecting him.  The reasons for suspending the execution of the orders of the Court of Directors contain no charge, nor the slightest imputation of a charge, against Mr. Fowke; but I see no reason why the board should condescend to tell him so.”  Accordingly, the proposition of Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheler, to inform Mr. Fowke “that they had no reason to be dissatisfied with his conduct,” on the previous question was rejected.

By this resolution Mr. Hastings and Mr. Barwell discovered another principle, and no less dangerous than the first:  namely, that persons deriving a valuable interest under the Company’s orders, so far from being heard in favor of their right, are not so much as to be informed of the grounds on which they are deprived of it.

The arrival soon after of Sir Eyre Coote giving another opportunity of trial, the question for obedience to the Company’s orders was again[13] brought on by Mr. Francis, and again received a negative.  Sir Eyre Coote, though present, and declaring, that, had he been at the original consultation, he should have voted for the immediate execution of the Company’s orders, yet he was resolved to avoid what he called any kind of retrospect.  His neutrality gained the question in favor of this, the third resolution for disobedience to orders.