This was again one of those instances that prove that when a strong and a weak nation concert in war, the weak one cannot desist unless it changes sides entirely and enters into war with its former ally.  None who were in the Government would hear of that, and with a heavy heart we gave our consent.  Bulgaria, who was not affected by this phase of the war, and had kept up diplomatic relations with America, was differently situated, being able to stand aside without paralysing the German plans.  Apart from this, I was already persuaded then that Bulgaria’s not joining in would make a bad impression on the outside world, and would not help her in any way.  Although her relations with America were maintained up to the last, they did not, as a matter of fact, make her fate easier.

Had we been able to make Germany desist from the unrestricted U-boat warfare, the advantage would have been very great; whether we joined in or not was a matter of indifference viewed from the standpoint of our treatment by the Entente, as is proved by the instance of Bulgaria.  As soon as America had declared war on Germany, a conflict with us was inevitable in any case, as Austro-Hungarian troops and artillery were then on the Western front facing Americans.  We were compelled to go to war with America, seeing that Germany was already at war with her.

It was not possible, therefore, for us to remain in a state of even nominally peaceful relations with America, such as existed between her and Bulgaria to the very end of the war.

It is not quite clear when Germany really recognised the fact that the unrestricted U-boat warfare had no effect, and was thus a terrible mistake.  To the public, as well as to the Allied Cabinets, the German military authorities continued to profess the greatest optimism, and when I left my post in April, 1918, the standpoint held in Berlin was still that England would be defeated by the naval war.  Writing on December 14, 1917, Hohenlohe reported that in competent German circles the feeling was thoroughly optimistic.  I, however, certainly perceived definite signs of doubt beginning in some German minds, and Ludendorff in replying to the reproaches I made to him said:  “Everything is risky in war; it is impossible before an operation to be sure of the results.  I admit that the time limit was a mistake, but the final result will show that I was right.”  In order to exculpate themselves all the leaders in Germany declared that America would, in any case, have gone to war, and that the U-boat had merely given the last impetus.  Whether this is quite true appears doubtful; it cannot either be asserted or denied positively.