to the anti-German Eastern States, but to the co-operation of the Central and Western States that are opposed to war, and to the Irish and Germans.  These considerations, together with the Entente’s insulting answer to President Wilson’s peace proposal, do not point to the probability of America plunging readily into war.

These, in brief, are the points of view on which the German demand for the immediate start of the unrestricted U-boat warfare is based, and which caused the Imperial Chancellor and the Foreign Affairs Department to revise their hitherto objective views.

Both the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Hungarian Prime Minister pointed out what disastrous consequences would ensue from America’s intervention, in a military, moral, agricultural and financial sense, and great doubt was expressed of the success of a blockade of England.  Count Czernin held that the Germans overlooked the possibility of lowering the consumption in England, taking into consideration the fact that since the war consumption in the countries of the Central Powers had been reduced by half.  Further, Count Czernin referred to the very vague and by no means convincing data of the German naval authorities.  It was also debated whether a continuation of the U-boat war to the present extent (the destruction on an average of 400,000 tons per month) would not be more likely to achieve the desired end, and if it were not more advisable not to play our last and best card until all other means had been tried.  The possibility of being able to start a ruthless U-boat warfare hung like a Damocles’ sword over the heads of our adversaries, and would perhaps be a more effectual means of ending the war than the reckless use of the U-boat as a weapon of war, carrying with it the danger of an attack by the neutrals.  If the effect expected by Germany was not realised, which was within the bounds of possibility, we must be prepared to see the desire for war in the enemy greatly intensified.  However that may be, the vanishing of the desire for peace must be accepted as an established fact.  Finally, it was pointed out that the arguments recently put forward by the Germans show a complete novum, namely, the danger on the Western front in view of the great Anglo-French offensive that is expected.  Whereas formerly it was always said that the attacks of the enemy would be repulsed, it is now considered necessary to relieve the land army by recklessly bringing the navy into the line of action.  If these fears are justified, then most certainly should all other considerations be put on one side and the risk ensuing from the ruthless employment of the U-boats be accepted.  Both Count Czernin and Count Tisza expressed their grave doubts in this connection.

To meet the case, the Hungarian Prime Minister pointed out the necessity of immediately starting propagandist activities in the neutral countries and particularly in America, by which the