After a two-days’ stay in Berlin my impression is that the question of the unrestricted U-boat warfare has again been brought to the front by the leading men in the German Empire.  This question—­according to Herr Zimmermann—­under conditions of the greatest secrecy where the public is concerned, is now under debate between the heads of the Army and Navy and the Foreign Office; they insist on a decision.  For if the unrestricted U-boat warfare is to be opened it must be at a time when, in view of the vast impending Anglo-French offensive on the Western front, it will make itself felt.  The Secretary of State mentioned the month of February.

  I wish in the following account to summarise the reasons put
  forward by the Germans for the justification of the unrestricted
  U-boat warfare: 

Time is against us and favours the Entente; if, therefore, the Entente can keep up the desire for war there will be still less prospect of our obtaining a peace on our own terms.  The enemy’s last Note to Wilson is again a striking example of their war energy.

It will be impossible for the Central Powers to continue the war after 1917 with any prospect of success.  Peace must, therefore, unless it finally has to be proposed by the enemy, be secured in the course of this year, which means that we must enforce it.

The military situation is unfavourable owing to the impending Anglo-French offensive, which, it is presumed, will open with great force, as in the case of the last offensive on the Somme.  To meet the attack, troops will have to be withdrawn from other fronts.  Consequently, an offensive against Russia with intent to bring that enemy to his knees, which perhaps a year ago would have been possible, can no longer be reckoned on.

If, therefore, the possibility of enforcing a decision in the East becomes less and less, an effort must be made to bring it about in the West, and to do it at a time when the unrestricted U-boat warfare would affect the coming Anglo-French offensive by impeding the transport of troops and munitions sailing under a neutral flag.

In estimating the effect on England of the unrestricted U-boat warfare, there will be not only the question of hindering the transport of provisions, but also of curtailing the traffic to such a degree as would render it impossible for the English to continue the war.  In Italy and in France this will be felt no less severely.  The neutrals, too, will be made to suffer, which, however, might serve as a pretext to bring about peace.

  America will hardly push matters further than breaking off
  diplomatic relations; we need not, therefore, count for certain on
  a war with the United States.