On the one hand, all leading military and naval authorities insist on making use of this means as speedily as possible, as they declare it will end the war much more rapidly; on the other hand, all statesmen have grave fears as to what effect it will have on America and other neutrals.

The Supreme Military Command declares that a new offensive on a very large scale is imminent in the West and that the armies which are to resist this attack will not be able to understand why the navy should not do all that lies in its power to prevent, or at any rate to decrease, the reserves and ammunition being sent to our adversaries.  The absence of co-operation on the part of the navy in the terrible battles the troops on the Western front will again have to face will have a most injurious effect on their moral.

The objections put forward as to the effect the proceeding might have on America are met in military circles by the assumption that America will take good care not to go to war; that she, in fact, would not be able to do so.  The unfortunate failure of the United States military machine in the conflict with Mexico clearly proves what is to be expected from America in that respect.  Even a possible breaking off relations with America does not necessarily signify war.

Meanwhile all the leading naval authorities reassert that they may be relied on, even though they are not considered capable of crushing England, at least to be able, before America can come in, so to weaken the British Island Empire that only one desire will be left to English politicians, that of seating themselves with us at the Conference table.

To this the Chancellor asked who would give him a guarantee that the navy was right and in what position should we find ourselves in case the admirals were mistaken, whereupon the Admiralty promptly asked what sort of position the Chancellor expected to find when autumn arrived without having made a proper use of the U-boats and we found ourselves, through exhaustion, compelled to beg for peace.

  And thus the scales went up and down, weighing the chances for or
  against the U-boat war, and there was no possibility of positively
  determining which decision was the right one.

Doubtless the German Government in the near future will be constrained to take up a definite standpoint respecting the question, and it is obvious—­whatever the decision may be—­that we also shall be largely involved.  Nevertheless, it appears to me that when the German Government does approach us in that connection we should act with all possible reserve.  As the matter now stands, a positive decision as to which course is the right one is not possible.  I have, therefore, thought it inadvisable to take side definitely with either party and thus remove much of the responsibility from the German Government and render it possible for them to lay it upon us.

  The Imperial and Royal Ambassador,