Some months after the outbreak of war I had a long conversation on all these questions with the Hungarian Prime Minister, Count Stephen Tisza.  He was decidedly opposed to the severe ultimatum, as he foresaw a war and did not wish for it.  It is one of the most widely spread errors to stigmatise Tisza to-day as one of the instigators of the war.  He was opposed to it, not from a general pacifist tendency, but because, in his opinion, an efficiently pursued policy of alliance would in a few years considerably strengthen the powers of the Monarchy.  He particularly returned to the subject of Bulgaria, which then was still neutral and whose support he had hoped to gain before we went to war.  I also obtained from Tisza several details concerning the activities of the German Government as displayed by the German Ambassador immediately preceding the war.  I purposely made a distinction between the German Government and the German diplomat, as I was under the impression that Herr von Tschirsky had taken various steps without being instructed so to do, and when I previously have alluded to the fact that not all the ambassadors made use of the language enjoined by their Governments, I had Herr von Tschirsky specially in my mind; his whole temperament and feelings led him to interfere in our affairs with a certain vehemence and not always in the most tactful way, thus rousing the Monarchy out of its lethargy.

There is no doubt whatever that all Herr von Tschirsky’s private speeches at this time were attuned to the tone of “Now or Never,” and it is certain that the German Ambassador declared his opinion to be “that at the present moment Germany was prepared to support our point of view with all her moral and military power, but whether this would prove to be the case in future if we accepted the Serbian rebuff appears to me doubtful.”  I believe that Tschirsky in particular was firmly persuaded that in the very near future Germany would have to go through a war against France and Russia, and he considered that the year 1914 would be more favourable than a later date.  For this reason, because first of all he did not believe in the fighting capacity of either Russia or France, and secondly because—­and this is a very important point—­he was convinced that he could bring the Monarchy into this war, while it appeared doubtful to him that the aged and peace-loving Emperor Francis Joseph would draw the sword for Germany on any other occasion where the action would centre less round him, he wished to make use of the Serbian episode so as to be sure of Austria-Hungary in the deciding struggle.  That, however, was his policy, and not Bethmann’s.