not dare take it upon herself to attack us.  This is the only reason that explains why the Roumanians surprised us so much by their invasion of Transylvania and by being able to carry off so much rich booty.  I would have been able to take much better care of the many Austrians and Hungarians living in Roumania—­whose fate was terrible after the declaration of war, which took them also by surprise—­if I had been permitted to draw their attention more openly and generally to the coming catastrophe; but in several of his letters Tisza implored me not to create a panic, “which would bring incalculable consequences with it.”  As I neither did, nor could, know how far this secrecy was in agreement with our military counter-preparations, I was bound to observe it.  Apparently, Burian believed my reports to a certain extent; at any rate, for some time before the declaration of war he ordered all the secret documents and the available money to be conveyed to Vienna, and entrusted to Holland the care of our citizens; but Tisza told me long after that he considered my reports of too pessimistic a tendency, and was afraid to give orders for the superfluous evacuation of Transylvania.

After the unexpected invasion, the waves of panic and rage ran high in the Hungarian Parliament.  The severest criticism was heaped upon me, as no one doubted that the lack of preparation was due to my false reports.  Here Tisza was again himself when, in a loud voice, he shouted out that it was untrue; my reports were correct; I had warned them in time and no blame could be attached to me; he thus took upon himself the just blame.  Fear was unknown to him, and he never tried to shield himself behind anyone.  When I arrived back in Vienna after a journey of some weeks in Russia, and only then heard of the incident, I took the opportunity to thank Tisza for the honourable and loyal manner in which he had defended my cause.  He replied with the ironical smile characteristic of him that it was simply a matter of course.

But for an Austro-Hungarian official it was by no means such a matter of course.  We have had so many cowards on the Ministerial benches, so many men who were brave when dealing with their subordinates, toadied to their superiors, and were intimidated by strong opposition, that a man like Tisza, who was such a contrast to these others, has a most refreshing and invigorating effect.  The Roumanians attempted several times to make the maintenance of their neutrality contingent on territorial concessions.  I was always opposed to this, and at the Ballplatz they were of the same opinion.  The Roumanians would have appropriated these concessions and simply attacked us later to obtain more.  On the other hand, it seemed to me that to gain military co-operation a cession of territory would be quite in order, since, once in the field, the Roumanians could not draw back and their fate would be permanently bound up with ours.