and a portion of the Bukovina.  I cannot say whether Count Burian, if he had escaped other influences, would have adopted the plan, but certain it is that however ready and willing he was to act he would never have carried out the plan against the Hungarian Parliament.  According to the Constitution, the Hungarian Parliament is sovereign in the Hungarian State, and without the use of armed means Hungary could never have been induced to cede any part of her territory.

It is obvious, however, that it would have been impossible during the world war to have stirred up an armed conflict between Vienna and Budapest.  My then German colleague, von dem Busche, entirely agreed with me that Hungary ought to make some territorial sacrifices in order to encourage Roumania’s intervention.  I firmly believe that then, and similarly before the Italian declaration of war, a certain pressure was brought to bear direct on Vienna by Berlin to this end—­a pressure which merely contributed to strengthen and intensify Tisza’s opposition.  For Germany, the question was far simpler; she had drawn payment for her great gains from a foreign source.  The cession of the Bukovina might possibly have been effected, as Stuergkh did not object, but that alone would not have satisfied Roumania.

It was quite clear that the opposition to the ceding of Transylvania originated in Hungary.  But this opposition was not specially Tisza’s, for whichever of the Hungarian politicians might have been at the head of the Cabinet he would have adopted the same standpoint.

I sent at that time a confidential messenger to Tisza enjoining him to explain the situation and begging him in my name to make the concession.  Tisza treated the messenger with great reserve, and wrote me a letter stating once for all that the voluntary cession of Hungarian territory was out of the question; “whoever attempts to seize even one square metre of Hungarian soil will be shot.”

There was nothing to be done.  And still I think that this was one of the most important phases of the war, which, had it been properly managed, might have influenced the final result.  The military advance on the flank of the Russian army would have been, in the opinion of our military chiefs, an advantage not to be despised, and through it the clever break through at Goerlitz would have had some results; but as it was, Goerlitz was a strategical trial of strength without any lasting effect.

The repellent attitude adopted by Hungary may be accounted for in two ways:  the Hungarians, to begin with, were averse to giving up any of their own territory, and, secondly, they did not believe—­even to the very last—­that Roumania would remain permanently neutral or that sooner or later we would be forced to fight against Roumania unless we in good time carried her with us.  In this connection Tisza always maintained his optimism, and to the very last moment held to the belief that Roumania would