imagined to be in a fair way to Vienna and Berlin, should suddenly begin to rush back and a fortress like Warsaw be demolished like a house of cards.  He was evidently very anxious then and must have had many a disturbed night.  On the other hand, those who to begin with, though not for, still were not against Austria began to raise their heads and breathe more freely.  The victory of the Central Powers appeared on the horizon like a fresh event.  That was the historic moment when Roumania might have been coerced into active co-operation, but not the Bratianu Ministry.  Bratianu himself would never in any case have ranged himself on our side, but if we could have made up our minds then to instal a Majorescu or a Marghiloman Ministry in office, we could have had the Roumanian army with us.  In connection with this were several concrete proposals.  In order to carry out the plan we should have been compelled to make territorial concessions in Hungary to a Majorescu Ministry—­Majorescu demanded it as a primary condition to his undertaking the conduct of affairs, and this proposal failed owing to Hungary’s obstinate resistance.  It is a terrible but a just punishment that poor Hungary, who contributed so much to our definite defeat, should be the one to suffer the most from the consequences thereof, and that the Roumanians, so despised and persecuted by Hungary, should gain the greatest triumphs on her plains.

One of the many reproaches that have been brought against me recently is to the effect that I, as ambassador at Bucharest, should have resigned if my proposals were not accepted in Vienna.  These reproaches are dictated by quite mistaken ideas of competency and responsibility.  It is the duty of a subordinate official to describe the situation as he sees it and to make such proposals as he considers right, but the responsibility for the policy is with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and it would lead to the most impossible and absurd state of things if every ambassador whose proposals were rejected were to draw the conclusion that his resignation was a necessary consequence thereof.  If officials were to resign because they did not agree with the view of their chief, it would mean that almost all of them would send in their resignations.

Espionage and counter-espionage have greatly flourished during the war.  In that connection Russia showed great activity in Roumania.

In October, 1914, an event occurred which was very unfortunate for me.  I drove from Bucharest to Sinaia, carrying certain political documents with me in a dispatch-case, which, by mistake, was fastened on behind instead of being laid in the car.  On the way the case was unstrapped and stolen.  I made every effort to get it back, and eventually recovered it after a search of three weeks, involving much expense.  It was found at last in some peasant’s barn, but nothing had apparently been abstracted save the cigarettes that were in it.