Even from 1914-16 Roumania was never really neutral.  She always favoured our enemies, and as far as lay in her power hindered all our actions.

The transport of horses and ammunition to Turkey in the summer of 1915 that was exacted from us was an important episode.  Turkey was then in great danger, and was asking anxiously for munitions.  Had the Roumanian Government adopted the standpoint not to favour any of the belligerent Powers it would have been a perfectly correct attitude, viewed from a neutral standpoint, but she never did adopt such standpoint, as is shown by her allowing the Serbians to receive transports of Russian ammunition via the Danube, thus showing great partiality.  When all attempts failed, the munitions were transmitted, partially at any rate, through other means.

At that time, too, Russian soldiers were allowed in Roumania and were not molested, whereas ours were invariably interned.

Two Austrian airmen once landed by mistake in Roumania, and were, of course, interned immediately.  The one was a cadet of the name of Berthold and a pilot whose name I have forgotten.  From their prison they appealed to me to help them, and I sent word that they must endeavour to obtain permission to pay me a visit.  A few days later the cadet appeared, escorted by a Roumanian officer as guard.  This officer, not being allowed without special permission to set foot on Austro-Hungarian soil, was obliged to remain in the street outside the house.  I had the gates closed, put the cadet into one of my cars, sent him out through the back entrance, and had him driven to Giurgui, where he got across the Danube, and in two hours was again at liberty.  After a lengthy and futile wait the officer departed.  His protests came too late.

The unfortunate pilot who was left behind was not allowed to come to the Embassy.  One night, however, he made his escape through the window and arrived.  I kept him concealed for some time, and he eventually crossed the frontier safely and got away by rail to Hungary.

Bratianu reproached me later for what I had done, but I told him it was in consequence of his not having strictly adhered to his neutrality.  Had our soldiers been left unmolested, as in the case of the Russians, I should not have been compelled to act as I had done.

Bratianu can never seriously have doubted that the Central Powers would succumb, and his sympathies were always with the Entente, not only on account of his bringing up, but also because of that political speculation.  During the course of subsequent events there were times when Bratianu to a certain extent seemed to vacillate, especially at the time of our great offensive against Russia.  The break through at Goerlitz and the irresistible advance into the interior of Russia had an astounding effect in Roumania.  Bratianu, who obviously knew very little about strategy, could simply not understand that the Russian millions, whom he