refuse it, and then, thanks to Germany’s help, the victorious war against Russia and France will effect the birth of a new and vastly stronger Monarchy.  It cannot for a moment be denied that this argument contained a series of errors; but it must be stated that, according to my convictions, Count Berchtold did not intend to incite war by the ultimatum, but hoped to the very last to gain the victory by the pen, and that in the German promises he saw a guarantee against a war in which the participators and the chances of victory were equally erroneously estimated.

Berchtold could not have entertained any doubt that a Serbian war would bring a Russian one in its train.  At any rate, the reports sent by my brother, who was a business man in Petersburg, left him in no doubt on the matter.

Serbia’s acceptance of the ultimatum was only partial, and the Serbian war broke out.  Russia armed and joined in.  But at this moment extremely important events took place.

On July 30, at midday, Tschirsky spoke in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and communicated to Berchtold the contents of a telegram received from Lichnowsky.  This important telegram contained the following:  He (Lichnowsky) had just returned from seeing Grey, who was very grave, but perfectly collected, though pointing out that the situation was becoming more and more complicated.  Sassonoff had intimated that after the declaration of war he was no longer in a position to negotiate direct with Austria-Hungary, and requested England to resume proceedings, the temporary cessation of hostilities to be taken for granted.  Grey proposed a negotiation between four, as it appeared possible to him (Grey) that Austria-Hungary, after occupying Belgrade, would state her terms.

To this Grey added a private comment, calling Lichnowsky’s attention to the fact that a war between Russia and Austria-Hungary would facilitate England’s neutrality, but that the conditions would inevitably change in the event of Germany and France being involved.  Public opinion in England, which after the assassination was very favourable to Austria, was now beginning to fluctuate, as it was difficult to understand Austria’s obstinacy.

Lichnowsky also added that Grey had told the Italian Ambassador that he thought Austria would receive every satisfaction on accepting negotiation.  In any case the Serbians would be punished.  Even without a war Austria would receive a guarantee for the future.

Such were the contents of the communication from London sent by Tschirsky, to which Bethmann added that he urgently requested the Vienna Cabinet to accept the negotiation.  On receiving this information, Berchtold conveyed the news to the Emperor.  His position was this:  that Russia was already at war with the Monarchy on the evening of the same day on which the order for general mobilisation was to be submitted to the Emperor, and it appeared doubtful to him whether a postponement of their own mobilisation would be possible