division of the world a certain part was to be played by Russia and Japan, but he paid little heed to the other states, especially to France, convinced that they were all nations of declining power.  To maintain that William intentionally prepared and started this war is in direct opposition to his long years of peaceful government.  Helfferich, in his work “Die Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges,” speaks of the Emperor’s attitude during the Balkan troubles, and says: 

A telegram sent by William II. at that time to the Imperial Chancellor explains the attitude of the German Emperor in this critical position for German politics, being similar to the situation in July, 1914.  The contents of the telegram are as follows:  “The Alliance with Austria-Hungary compels us to take action should Austria-Hungary be attacked by Russia.  In that case France would also be involved, and in those circumstances England would not long remain quiescent.  The present prevailing questions of dispute cannot be compared with that danger.  It cannot be the intention of the Alliance that we, the life interest of our ally not being endangered, should enter upon a life-and-death conflict for a caprice of that ally.  Should it become evident that the other side intend to attack, the danger must then be faced.”

This calm and decided standpoint which alone could maintain peace was also the German policy observed in further developments.  It was upheld when confronted by strong pressure from Russia, as also against other tendencies and a certain transitory ill-feeling in Vienna.

Whether such feeling did exist in Vienna or not I cannot say, but I believe the account is correct.

It has already been mentioned that all the warlike speeches flung into the world by the Emperor were due to a mistaken understanding of their effect.  I allow that the Emperor wished to create a sensation, even to terrify people, but he also wished to act on the principle of si vis pacem para bellum, and by emphasising the military power of Germany he endeavoured to prevent the many envious enemies of his Empire from declaring war on him.

It cannot be denied that this attitude was often both unfortunate and mistaken, and that it contributed to the outbreak of war; but it is asserted that the Emperor was devoid of the dolus of making war; that he said and did things by which he unintentionally stirred up war.

Had there been men in Germany ready to point out to the Emperor the injurious effects of his behaviour and to make him feel the growing mistrust of him throughout the world, had there been not one or two but dozens of such men, it would assuredly have made an impression on the Emperor.  It is quite true that of all the inhabitants of the earth, the German is the one the least capable of adapting himself to the mentality of other people, and, as a matter of fact, there were perhaps but few in the immediate entourage of the Emperor