of Germany, on the irrepressible desire for expansion to be found in the German people, on the necessity of impregnating the world with German culture, and on the progress made in all these endeavours.  He discoursed on the rising prosperity of German trade in different parts of the world; he enumerated the towns where the German flag was flying; he pointed out with emphasis how “Made in Germany” was the term that must and would conquer the world, and did not fail to assert that all these grand projects were built on solid foundations upheld by military support.  Such was the German.  When my informant turned to the silent, quietly smiling Englishman and asked what he had to say to it, he simply answered:  “There is no need for me to say anything, for I know that the world belongs to us.”  Such was the Englishman.  This merely illustrates a certain frame of mind.  It is a snapshot, showing how the German and the English mentality was reflected in the brain of a neutral statesman; but it is symptomatic, because thousands have felt the same, and because this impression of the German spirit contributed so largely to the catastrophe.

The Aehrenthal policy, contrary to what we were accustomed to on the Ballplatz, pursued ambitious plans for expansion with the greatest strength and energy, thereby adding to the suspicions of the world regarding us.  For the belief gained credence that the Vienna policy was an offshoot of that of Berlin, and that the same line of action would be adopted in Vienna as in Berlin, and the general feeling of anxiety rose higher.  Blacker and blacker grew the clouds; closer and closer the meshes of the net; misfortune was on the way.

2

I was in Constantinople shortly before the outbreak of war, and while there had a lengthy discussion of the political situation with the Markgraf Pallavicini, our most efficient and far-seeing ambassador there.  He looked upon the situation as being extremely grave.  Aided by his experience of a decade of political observations, he was able to put his finger on the pulse of Europe, and his diagnosis was as follows:  that if a rapid change in the entire course of events did not intervene, we were making straight for war.  He explained to me that he considered the only possibility of evading a war with Russia lay in our definitely renouncing all claims to influence in the Balkans and leaving the field to Russia.  Pallavicini was quite clear in his own mind that such a course would mean our resigning the status of a Great Power; but apparently to him even so bitter a proceeding as that was preferable to the war which he saw was impending.  Shortly afterwards I repeated this conversation to the Archduke and heir, Franz Ferdinand, and saw that he was deeply impressed by the pessimistic views of Pallavicini, of whom, like everyone else, he had a very high opinion.  The Archduke promised to discuss the question as soon as possible with the Emperor.  I never saw him again.  That was the last conversation I had with him, and I do not know whether he ever carried out his intention of discussing the matter with the monarch.