But the war would never have broken out had it not been that the growing suspicion of the Entente as to Germany’s plans had already brought the situation to boiling point.  The spirit and demeanour of Germany, the speeches of the Emperor William, the behaviour of the Prussians throughout the world—­whether in the case of a general at Potsdam or a commis voyageur out in East Africa—­these Prussian manners inflicting themselves upon the world, the ceaseless boasting of their own power and the clattering of swords, roused throughout the whole world a feeling of antipathy and alarm and effected that moral coalition against Germany which in this war has found such terribly practical expression.  On the other hand, I am fairly convinced that German, or rather Prussian tendencies have been misunderstood by the world, and that the leading German statesmen never had any intention of acquiring world dominion.  They wished to retain Germany’s place in the sun, her rank among the first Powers of the world; it was undoubtedly her right, but the real and alleged continuous German provocation and the ever-growing fears of the Entente in consequence created just that fatal competition in armaments and that coalition policy which burst like a terrible thunderstorm into war.

It was only on the basis of these European fears that the French plans of revenge developed into action.  England would never have drawn the sword merely for the conquest of Alsace-Lorraine; but the French plan of revenge was admirably adapted to suit the policy inaugurated by King Edward, which was derived not from French but from English motives.

Out of this dread of attack and defence arose that mad fever for armaments which was characteristic of pre-war times.  The race to possess more soldiers and more guns than one’s neighbour was carried to an absurd extreme.  The armaments which the nations had to bear had become so cumbersome as to be unbearable, and for long it had been obvious to everyone that the course entered upon could no longer be pursued, and that two possibilities alone remained—­either a voluntary and general disarmament, or war.

A slight attempt at the first alternative was made in 1912 through negotiations between Germany and England respecting naval disarmament, but never got beyond the first stage.  England was no readier for peace, and no more disposed to make advances than was Germany, but she was cleverer and succeeded in conveying to the world that she was the Power endangered by Germany’s plans for expansion.

I recollect a very telling illustration of the German and British points of view, given to me by a prominent politician from a neutral state.  This gentleman was crossing the Atlantic on an American steamer, and among the other travellers were a well-known German industrial magnate and an Englishman.  The German was a great talker and preferred addressing as large an audience as possible, expatiating on the “uprising”