It will be remembered how, in the early autumn of 1917, the majority of the German Reichstag had a hard fight against the numerically weaker but, from their relation to the German Army Command, extremely powerful minority on the question of the reply to the Papal Note.  Here again I was no idle spectator.  One of my friends, at my instigation, had several conversations with Suedekum and Erzberger, and encouraged them, by my description of our own position, to pass the well known peace resolution.  It was owing to this description of the state of affairs here that the two gentlemen mentioned were enabled to carry the Reichstag’s resolution in favour of a peace by mutual understanding—­the resolution which met with such disdain and scorn from the Pan-Germans and other elements.  I hoped then, for a moment, to have gained a lasting and powerful alliance in the German Reichstag against the German military plans of conquest.

And now, gentlemen, I should like to say a few words on the subject of that unfortunate submarine campaign which was undoubtedly the beginning of the end, and to set forth the reasons which in this case, as in many other instances, forced us to adopt tactics not in accordance with our own convictions.  Shortly after my appointment as Minister the idea of unrestricted submarine warfare began to take form in German minds.  The principal advocate of this plan was Admiral Tirpitz.  To the credit of the former Reichskansler, Bethmann-Hollweg, be it said that he was long opposed to the idea, and used all means and every argument to dissuade others from adopting so perilous a proceeding.  In the end he was forced to give way, as was the case with all politicians who came in conflict with the all-powerful military party.  Admiral Holtzendorff came to us at that time, and the question was debated from every point of view in long conferences lasting for hours.  My then ministerial colleagues, Tisza and Clam, as well as myself were entirely in agreement with Emperor Charles in rejecting the proposal, and the only one who then voted unreservedly in favour of it was Admiral Haus.  It should here be noted that the principal German argument at that time was not the prospect of starving England into submission, but the suggestion that the Western front could not be held unless the American munition transports were sunk—­that is to say, the case for the submarine campaign was then based chiefly on a point of technical military importance and nothing else.  I myself earnestly considered the question then of separating ourselves from Germany on this point; with the small number of U-boats at our disposal it would have made but little difference had we on our part refrained.  But another point had here to be considered.  If the submarine campaign was to succeed in the northern waters it must be carried out at the same time in the Mediterranean.  With this latter water unaffected the transports would have been sent via Italy, France