But to return to the German military party.  This had attained a degree of power in the State rarely equalled in history, and the rarity of the phenomenon was only exceeded by the suddenness of its terrible collapse.  The most striking personality in this group was General Ludendorff.  Ludendorff was a great man, a man of genius, in conception, a man of indomitable energy and great gifts.  But this man required a political brake, so to speak, a political element in the Wilhelmstrasse capable of balancing his influence, and this was never found.  It must fairly be admitted that the German generals achieved the gigantic, and there was a time when they were looked up to by the people almost as gods.  It may be true that all great strategists are much alike; they look to victory always and to nothing else.  Moltke himself, perhaps, was nothing more, but he had a Bismarck to maintain equilibrium.  We had no such Bismarck, and when all is said and done it was not the fault of Ludendorff, or it is at any rate an excuse for him, that he was the only supremely powerful character in the whole of Germany, and that in consequence the entire policy of the country was directed into military channels.  Ludendorff was a great patriot, desiring nothing for himself, but seeking only the happiness of his country; a military genius, a hard man, utterly fearless—­and for all that a misfortune in that he looked at the whole world through Potsdam glasses, with an altogether erroneous judgment, wrecking every attempt at peace which was not a peace by victory.  Those very people who worshipped Ludendorff when he spoke of a victorious peace stone him now for that very thing; Ludendorff was exactly like the statesmen of England and France, who all rejected compromise and declared for victory alone; in this respect there was no difference between them.  The peace of mutual understanding which I wished for was rejected on the Thames and on the Seine just as by Ludendorff himself.  I have said this already.  According to the treaty it was our undoubted duty to carry on a defensive war to the utmost and reciprocally to defend the integrity of the State.  It is therefore perfectly obvious that I could never publicly express any other view, that I was throughout forced to declare that we were fighting for Alsace-Lorraine just as we were for Trentino, that I could not relinquish German territory to the Entente so long as I lacked the power to persuade Germany herself to such a step.  But, as I will show, the most strenuous endeavours were made in this latter direction.  And I may here in parenthesis remark that our military men throughout refrained from committing the error of the German generals, and interfering in politics themselves.  It is undoubtedly to the credit of our Emperor that whenever any tendency to such interference appeared he quashed it at once.  But in particular I should point out that the Archduke Frederick confined his activity solely to the task of bringing about peace.  He has rendered most valuable service in this, as also in his endeavours to arrive at favourable relations with Germany.