into question at all, would have been that we should even then, after such a success, have proved strong enough to bear a peace with sacrifice.  We were not called upon to agree to this, but the second requirement would undoubtedly have been refused by Germany, just as the first had been by Hungary.  I do not positively assert that peace would have been possible in this or any other case, but I do positively maintain that during my period of office such a peace by sacrifice was the utmost we and Germany could have attained.  The future will show what superhuman efforts we have made to induce Germany to give way.  That all proved fruitless was not the fault of the German people, nor was it, in my opinion, the fault of the German Emperor, but that of the leaders of the German military party, which had attained such enormous power in the country.  Everyone in Wilhelmstrasse, from Bethmann to Kuehlmann, wanted peace; but they could not get it simply because the military party got rid of everyone who ventured to act otherwise than as they wished.  This also applies to Bethmann and Kuehlmann.  The Pan-Germanists, under the leadership of the military party, could not understand that it was possible to die through being victorious, that victories are worthless when they do not lead to peace, that territories held in an iron grasp as “security” are valueless securities as long as the opposing party cannot be forced to redeem them.  There were various shades of this Pan-Germanism.  One section demanded the annexation of parts of Belgium and France, with an indemnity of milliards; others were less exorbitant, but all were agreed that peace could only be concluded with an extension of German possessions.  It was the easiest thing in the world to get on well with the German military party so long as one believed in their fantastic ideas and took a victorious peace for granted, dividing up the world thereafter at will.  But if anyone attempted to look at things from the point of view of the real situation, and ventured to reckon with the possibility of a less satisfactory termination of the war, the obstacles then encountered were not easily surmounted.  We all of us remember those speeches in which constant reference was always made to a “stern peace,” a “German peace,” a “victorious peace.”  For us, then, the possibility of a more favourable peace—­I mean a peace based on mutual understanding—­I have never believed in the possibility of a victorious peace—­would only have been acute in the case of Poland and the Austro-Polish question.  But I cannot sufficiently emphasise the fact that the Austro-Polish solution never was an obstacle in the way of peace and could never have been so.  There was only the idea that Austrian Poland and the former Russian Poland might be united and attached to the Monarchy.  It was never suggested that such a step should be enforced against the will of Poland itself or against the will of the Entente.  There was a time when it looked as if not only Poland but also certain sections among the Entente were not disinclined to agree to such a solution.