had begun the war in common, and we could not end it save in common. For us there was no way out of the war; we could only choose between fighting with Germany against the Entente, or fighting with the Entente against Germany until Germany herself gave way.  A slight foretaste of what would have happened was given us through the separatist steps taken by Andrassy at the last moment.  This utterly defeated, already annihilated and prostrate Germany had yet the power to fling troops toward the Tyrol, and had not the revolution overwhelmed all Germany like a conflagration, smothering the war itself, I am not sure but that the Tyrol might at the last moment have been harried by war.  And, gentlemen, I have more to say.  The experiment of separate peace would not only have involved us in a civil war, not only brought the war into our own country, but even then the final outcome would have been much the same.  The dissolution of the Monarchy into its component national parts was postulated throughout by the Entente.  I need only refer to the Conference of London.  But whether the State be dissolved by way of reward to the people or by way of punishment to the State makes little difference; the effect is the same.  In this case also a “German Austria” would have arisen, and in such a development it would have been hard for the German-Austrian people to take up an attitude which rendered them allies of the Entente.  In my own case, as Minister of the Imperial and Royal Government, it was my duty also to consider dynastic interests, and I never lost sight of that obligation.  But I believe that in this respect also the end would have been the same.  In particular the dissolution of the Monarchy into its national elements by legal means, against the opposition of the Germans and Hungarians, would have been a complete impossibility.  And the Germans in Austria would never have forgiven the Crown if it had entered upon a war with Germany; the Emperor would have been constantly encountering the powerful Republican tendencies of the Czechs, and he would have been in constant conflict with the King of Serbia over the South-Slav question, an ally being naturally nearer to the Entente than the Habsburgers.  And, finally, the Hungarians would never have forgiven the Emperor if he had freely conceded extensive territories to Bohemia and to the South-Slav state; I believe, then, that in this confusion the Crown would have fallen, as it has done in fact. A separate peace was a sheer impossibility. There remained the second way:  to make peace jointly with Germany.  Before going into the difficulties which rendered this way impossible I must briefly point out wherein lay our great dependence upon Germany.  First of all, in military respects.  Again and again we were forced to rely on aid from Germany.  In Roumania, in Italy, in Serbia, and in Russia we were victorious with the Germans beside us.  We were in the position of a poor relation living by the grace