it was the overwhelming power of circumstances which has led our policy to take the course it did.  The new arrangement of relations between ourselves and Germany will make an end of all secret proceedings.  The day will come then when, fortunately, all that has hitherto been hidden will be made clear.  As, however, I do not know when all this will be made public, I am grateful for the opportunity of lifting the veil to-day from certain hitherto unknown events.  In treating of this theme I will refrain from touching upon those constitutional factors which once counted for so much, but which do so no longer.  I do so because it seems to me unfair to import into the discussion persons who are now paying heavily for what they may have done and who are unable to defend themselves.  And I must pay this honourable tribute to the Austro-Hungarian Press, that it has on the whole sought to spare the former Emperor as far as possible.  There are, of course, exceptions—­exceptiones firmant regulam.  There are in Vienna, as everywhere else, men who find it more agreeable to attack, the less if those whom they are attacking are able to defend themselves.  But, believe me, gentlemen, those who think thus are not the bravest, not the best, nor the most reliable; and we may be glad that they form so insignificant a minority.

But, to come to the point.  Before passing on to a consideration of the various phases of the work for peace, I should like to point out two things:  firstly, that since the entry of Italy and Roumania into the war, and especially since the entry of America, a “victorious peace” on our part has been a Utopian idea, a Utopia which, unfortunately, was throughout cherished by the German military party; and, secondly, that we have never received any offer of peace from the Entente.  On several occasions peace feelers were put forward between representatives of the Entente and our own; unfortunately, however, these never led to any concrete conditions.  We often had the impression that we might conclude a separate peace without Germany, but we were never told the concrete conditions upon which Germany, on its part, could make peace; and, in particular, we were never informed that Germany would be allowed to retain its possessions as before the war, in consequence of which we were left in the position of having to fight a war of defence for Germany.  We were compelled by our treaty to a common defence of the pre-war possessions, and since the Entente never declared its willingness to treat with a Germany which wished for no annexations, since the Entente constantly declared its intention of annihilating Germany, we were forced to defend Germany, and our position in Berlin was rendered unspeakably more difficult.  We ourselves, also, were never given any assurance that we should be allowed to retain our former possessions; but in our case the desire for peace was so strong that we would have made territorial concessions if we had been able thereby to secure general