4.  In what manner it was to be organised (by general franchise, by a vote of the nobles, etc.).  It would be advisable, and would also be in accordance with the principles adopted by Russia, to leave the decision on all these points to the people themselves, and deliver them over to the “temporary self-administrative body,” which should, also according to the Russian proposal (Kameneff), be introduced at once.  The whole of the peace negotiations could then be concentrated upon a single point:  the question as to the composition of this temporary body.  Here, however, a compromise could be arrived at, as Russia could agree that the already existent bodies set in the foreground by Germany should be allowed to express a part of the will of the people, Germany agreeing that these bodies should, during the occupation, be supplemented by elements appointed, according to the Russian principles, by free election.

On February 7, immediately after Herr Kuehlmann had agreed to mediation on this basis, the Foreign Minister saw the leader of the Russian delegation, Trotski, and had a series of conversations with him.  The idea of compromise on the lines just set forth was little to Trotski’s taste, and he declared that he would in any case protest against the handling of the self-determination question by the Four Powers.  On the other hand, the discussion did lead to some result, in that a new basis for disposing of the difficulties which had arisen was now found.  There was to be no further continuance of the conflict as to whether the territorial alterations involved by the peace should be termed “annexations,” as the Russian delegates wished, or “exercise of the right of self-determination,” as Germany wished; the territorial alterations were to be simply noted in the peace treaty ("Russia notes that ...").  Trotski, however, made his acquiescence to the conclusion of such a compact subject to two conditions:  one being that the Moon Sound Islands and the Baltic ports should remain with Russia; the other that Germany and Austria-Hungary should not conclude any separate peace with the Ukrainian People’s Republic, whose Government was then seriously threatened by the Bolsheviks and, according to some reports, already overthrown by them.  The Foreign Minister was now anxious to arrive at a compromise on this question also, in which he had to a certain degree the support of Herr von Kuehlmann, while General Hoffmann most vehemently opposed any further concession.

All these negotiations for a compromise failed to achieve their end owing to the fact that Herr Kuehlmann was forced by the German Supreme Army Command to act promptly.  Ludendorff declared that the negotiations with Russia must be concluded within three days, and when a telegram from Petersburg was picked up in Berlin calling on the German Army to rise in revolt Herr von Kuehlmann was strictly ordered not to be content with the cessions already agreed to, but to demand