this, at a most critical moment, to a degree that can hardly be appreciated from a distance.  He was required to exert pressure upon Germany, and was now forced, not merely to ask, but to entreat Germany’s aid in sending supplies of food, or Vienna would within a few days be in the throes of a catastrophe.  With the enemy, on the other hand, he was forced, owing to the situation at home, to strive for a settlement of peace that should be favourable to Austria, in spite of the fact that our food situation and our labour troubles were well known to that enemy.

This complete alteration of the position changed the whole basis and tactics of the Foreign Minister’s proceedings.  He had to obtain the supplies of grain asked for from Germany and thus to diminish political pressure on that country; but at the same time he had to persuade the Soviet delegates to continue negotiations, and finally to arrive at a settlement of peace under the most acceptable conditions possible with the Ukraine, which would put an end to the still serious difficulties of the food situation.

In these circumstances it was impossible now to work on the German delegates by talking of Austria-Hungary’s concluding a separate peace with Russia, as this would have imperilled the chance of food supplies from Germany—­the more so as the representative of the German Army Command had declared that it was immaterial whether Austria-Hungary made peace or not.  Germany would in any case march on Petersburg if the Russian Government did not give way.  On the other hand, however, the Foreign Minister prevailed on the leader of the Russian delegation to postpone the carrying out of the intentions of his Government—­to the effect that the Russian delegation, owing to lack of good faith on the part of German-Austro-Hungarian negotiators, should be recalled.

At the same time the negotiations with the Ukrainian delegation were continued.  By means of lengthy and wearisome conferences we succeeded in bringing their demands to a footing which might just possibly be acceptable, and gaining their agreement to a clause whereby Ukraine undertook to deliver at least 1,000,000 tons of grain by August, 1918.  As to the demand for the Cholm territory, which we had wished to have relegated to the negotiations with Poland, the Ukrainian delegates refused to give way on this point, and were evidently supported by General Hoffmann.  Altogether the German military party seemed much inclined to support Ukrainian demands and extremely indisposed to accede to Polish claims, so that we were unable to obtain the admission of Polish representatives to the proceedings, though we had frequently asked for this.  A further difficulty in the way of this was the fact that Trotski himself was unwilling to recognise the Polish party as having equal rights here.  The only result obtainable was that the Ukrainians should restrict their claims on the Cholm territory to those parts inhabited by Ukrainian majority