In discussing this draft with the German delegates two points in particular were found to present great difficulty.  One was that of evacuation.  The German Army Command declared categorically that no evacuation of the occupied districts could be thought of until after conclusion of the general peace.  The second difficulty arose in connection with the question as to treatment of the occupied districts.  Germany insisted that in the peace treaty with Russia it should be simply stated that Russia had conceded to the peoples within its territory the right of self-determination, and that the nations in question had already availed themselves of that right.  The plain standpoint laid down in our draft we were unable to carry through, although it was shared by the other Allies.  However, in formulating the answer sent on December 25, 1916, to the Russian peace proposals a compromise was, after persistent efforts on our part, ultimately arrived at which at least prevented the full adoption of the divergent German point of view on these two points.  In the matter of evacuation the Germans agreed that the withdrawal of certain bodies of troops before the general peace might be discussed.

In the matter of annexations a satisfactory manner of formulating this was found, making it applicable only in the event of general peace.  Had the Entente then been disposed to make peace the principle of “no annexations” would have succeeded throughout.

Even allowing for the conciliatory form given through our endeavours to this answer by the four Powers to the Russian proposals, the German Headquarters evinced extreme indignation.  Several highly outspoken telegrams from the German Supreme Command to the German delegates prove this.  The head of the German Delegation came near to being recalled on this account, and if this had been done it is likely that German foreign policy would have been placed in the hands of a firm adherent of the sternest military views.  As this, however, could only have had an unfavourable effect on the further progress of the negotiations, we were obliged to do all in our power to retain Herr Kuehlmann.  With this end in view he was informed and invited to advise Berlin that if Germany persisted in its harsh policy Austria-Hungary would be compelled to conclude a separate peace with Russia.  This declaration on the part of the Minister for Foreign Affairs did not fail to create a certain impression in Berlin, and was largely responsible for the fact that Kuehlmann was able to remain.

Kuehlmann’s difficult position and his desire to strengthen it rendered the discussion of the territorial questions, which were first officially touched upon on December 27, but had been already taken up in private meetings with the Russian delegates, a particularly awkward matter.  Germany insisted that the then Russian front was not to be evacuated until six months after the general peace.  Russia was disposed to agree to this, but demanded on the other hand that