question of union.  It was the motive power in the union with Germany, and the papers repeated daily that no material advantages which the Entente could offer to Austria could alter the decision.  How, therefore, can this same Social Democracy, whose entire political views and aims are subordinate to the desire for a union with Germany—­how can this Social Democracy demand a policy which, without doubt, must lead not only to a separation from Germany, but to a fratricidal war with the German nation?  And why condemn the upholding of allied relations when Andrassy was abused for doing the opposite?

But what was the situation in March, 1918, shortly before my resignation?  Germany stood at the height of her success.  I do not pretend to say that her success was real.  In this connection that is of no moment; but the Germans were persuaded that they were quite near a victorious end, that after leaving the Eastern front they would throw themselves on to the Western front, and that the war would end before America had time to come in.  Their reckoning was at fault, as we all know to-day.  But for the German generals the will to victory was the leading spirit, and all decisions arrived at by Germany against the defection of Austria-Hungary proceeded from that dominant influence.

As already mentioned, I stated in my speech of December 11, on foreign policy, that neither the Entente nor Germany would conclude a peace of renunciation.  Since then I have had opportunity to speak with several men of the Entente, and consequent on the views that I obtained, I feel I must formulate my previous opinion in still stronger terms.  I came to the firm conclusion that the Entente—­England above all—­from the summer of 1917 at any rate, had formed an unbending resolve to shatter Germany.

From that time onwards England, with the obstinacy which is her chief characteristic, appears to have been determined not to treat further with Germany, nor to sheathe her sword until Germany lay crushed to earth.  It makes no difference in the matter that the German military party—­though for other reasons—­from a total misconception of their chances of victory, steadily refused a peace involving sacrifice at a time when it might have been possible.  This is an historical fact, but as an upholder of truth I must distinctly state that I doubt whether concessions would have changed the fate of Germany. We could have gone over to the enemy—­in 1917 and also in 1918; we could have fought against Germany with the Entente on Austro-Hungarian soil, and would doubtless have hastened Germany’s collapse; but the wounds which Austria-Hungary would have received in the fray would not have been less serious than those from which she is now suffering:  she would have perished in the fight against Germany, as she has as good as perished in her fight allied with Germany.

Austria-Hungary’s watch had run down. Among the few statesmen who in 1914 wished for war—­like Tschirsky, for instance—­there can have been none who after a few months had not altered and regretted his views.  They, too, had not thought of a world war.  I believe to-day, nevertheless, that even without the war the fall of the Monarchy would have happened, and that the assassination in Serbia was the first step.