over the world at the time, it is again obvious that nervousness prevailing throughout the world must act like an electric current and excite public opinion accordingly.  We were fully aware of the disadvantage of this method of proceeding.  Nevertheless we at once agreed to the wish of the Russian Government in respect of this publicity, desiring to meet them as far as possible, and also because we had nothing to conceal on our part, and because it would have made an unfavourable impression if we had stood firmly by the methods hitherto pursued, of secrecy until completion. But the complete publicity in the negotiations makes it insistent that the great public, the country behind, and above all the leaders, must keep cool. The match must be played out in cold blood, and the end will be satisfactory if the peoples of the Monarchy support their representatives at the conference.

“It should be stated beforehand that the basis on which Austria-Hungary treats with the various newly-constituted Russian states is that of ‘no indemnities and no annexations.’  That is the programme which a year ago, shortly after my appointment as Minister, I put before those who wished to talk of peace, and which I repeated to the Russian leaders on the occasion of their first offers of peace.  And I have not deviated from that programme.  Those who believe that I am to be turned from the way which I have set myself to follow are poor psychologists.  I have never left the public in the slightest doubt as to which way I intended to go, and I have never allowed myself to be turned aside so much as a hair’s breadth from that way, either to right or left.  And I have since become far from a favourite of the Pan-Germans and of those in the Monarchy who follow the Pan-German ideas.  I have at the same time been hooted as an inveterate partisan of war by those whose programme is peace at any price, as innumerable letters have informed me.  Neither has ever disturbed me; on the contrary, the double insults have been my only comfort in this serious time.  I declare now once again that I ask not a single kreuzer, not a single square metre of land from Russia, and that if Russia, as appears to be the case, takes the same point of view, then peace must result.  Those who wish for peace at any price might entertain some doubt as to my ‘no-annexation’ intentions towards Russia if I did not tell them to their faces with the same complete frankness that I shall never assent to the conclusion of a peace going beyond the lines just laid down.  If the Russian delegates demand any surrender of territory on our part, or any war indemnity, then I shall continue the war, despite the fact that I am as anxious for peace as they, or I would resign if I could not attain the end I seek.

“This once said, and emphatically asserted, that there is no ground for the pessimistic anticipation of the peace falling through, since the negotiating committees are agreed on the basis of no annexations or indemnities—­and nothing but new instructions from the various Russian Governments, or their disappearance, could shift that basis—­I then pass to the two great difficulties in which are contained the reasons why the negotiations have not proceeded as quickly as we all wished.