If that could happen at a moment when it already was obvious that there was no longer a possibility of making a peace of understanding together with Germany—­what would have happened, I ask, at a time when this was by no means so clear to the great majority of the population; at a time when it was still far from certain, or, at least, not to be proved mathematically, that we in time and together with Germany might still be able to conclude a peace of understanding?  Disbandment at the front, where all would be fighting against all, civil war in the interior—­such would have been the result of a separate peace.  And all that in order finally to impose on us the resolutions passed in London!  For never—­as I shall presently show—­had the Entente given up their decision, as they were bound to Italy, and Italy would allow of no change.  Such a policy would have been as suicide from the sheer fear of death.

In 1917 I once discussed the whole question with the late Dr. Victor Adler, and pointed out to him the probabilities ensuing from a separate peace.

Dr. Adler replied:  “For God’s sake, do not plunge us into a war with Germany!” After the entry of Bavarian troops into the Tyrol (Adler was then a secretary in the Foreign Affairs department) he reminded me of our conversation, and added:  “The catastrophe we spoke of then has arrived.  The Tyrol will become a theatre of war.”

Everyone in Austria wished for peace.  No one wanted a new war—­and a separate peace would have brought about not peace, but a new war with Germany.

In Hungary, Stephen Tisza ruled with practically unlimited powers; he was far more powerful than the entire Wekerle Ministry put together.  As applied to Hungary, a separate peace would also have meant the carrying out of the Entente aims; that is, the loss of the largest and richest territories in the north and south of Czecho-Slovakia, Roumania and Serbia.  Is there anyone who can honestly maintain that the Hungarians in 1917 would have agreed to these sacrifices without putting up the bitterest resistance?  Everyone who knows the circumstances must admit that in this case Tisza would have had the whole of Hungary behind him in a fierce attack on Vienna.  Soon after I took office I had a long and very serious conversation with him on the German and the peace questions.  Tisza pointed out that the Germans were difficult to deal with; they were arrogant and despotic; yet without them we could not bring the war to an end.  The proposal to cede Hungarian territory (Transylvania) and also the plan to enforce an internal Hungarian reform in favour of the subject nationalities were matters that were not capable of discussion.  The congress in London in 1915 had adopted resolutions that were quite mad and never could be realised, and the desire for destruction prevailing in the Entente could only be suppressed by force.  In all circumstances, we must keep our place by the side of Germany.