king.  There was already then a certain fall in the value of kings on the European market, and I was afraid it might develop into a panic if we put more kings off their thrones.  The third reason was that, in order to conclude peace, we must have a competent representative in Roumania.  If we were to depose the King we should divide Roumania into two camps and would, at the best, only be able to conclude a transitory peace with that party which accepted the dethronement of the King.  A rapid and properly-secured peace could only be concluded with the legitimate head in Roumania.

In the introductory interviews which Colonel Randa had on February 4 and 5 with the confidential envoy from the King of Roumania, the envoy asked whether all the Quadruple Alliance Powers were acting in the step in question, and whether the occupied territory in Roumania would be released.  I was notified of this inquiry of the King, and replied that I was persuaded that no refusal need be expected from the other Central Powers should he, with the object of securing an honourable peace, address them accordingly.  As to the question of territorial possessions, I stated that, for the present, I was not able to express any opinion on the matter, as it would have to be a subject for the introductory negotiations.

The view held by the German military leaders in agreement with Hungarian politicians that Roumania should be treated differently from, and in a much sterner manner than, any other state was, if the question is considered from the point of view of retribution, quite justified.  Roumania’s actions with regard to us were far more treacherous than those of Italy.  Italy, owing to her geographical position and to the fact of her being totally dependent on the Western Powers—­a blockade by whom might finally have forced her to submit to their demands—­would have found it very difficult to remain neutral in this world war.  Roumania was not only perfectly independent, but was amply provided for through her rich granaries.  Apart from the fact that Roumania alone was to blame for allowing things to go so far that Russia was enabled finally to send her an ultimatum and so force her into war, it must be admitted that Roumania was far less likely to be influenced by the Entente than Italy.  But neither would the Russian ultimatum have taken effect if Roumania had not consciously and willingly placed herself in a position in regard to military and political matters that gave her into Russia’s power.  Bratianu said to me in one of our last interviews:  “Russia is exactly like a blackcock dancing before the hens.”  In admitting the truth of this appropriate comparison, it must be added that the female of the simile, longing to be embraced, directly provoked violence.

For two years Bratianu had stirred up public opinion against us in his own country.  Had he not done so, and had he not finally bared his Russian frontier of all troops, the Russian ultimatum would have had no effect.